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ABSTRACT
The dissertation explores determinants and consequences of international diversification 
and consists of two essays. Essay I focuses on the relationship between international 
diversification and firm performance (ID-P). Drawing on the global strategy literature 
and the institution-based view of strategy, we propose that the mixed findings of extant 
research on the ID-P relationship can be explained by the contextual conditions in which 
this relationship exists, including home-country formal and informal institutions. The 
model is tested in a meta-analysis (HOMA, MARA, and HiLLMA analyses) of firm-, 
industry-, and home country-level factors driving the ID-P relationship. The sample 
consists of 359 primary studies across 32 countries between 1972 and 2012—the largest 
sample of primary studies of any meta-analysis on this topic to date. The main finding is 
that international diversification positively impacts firm performance and the strength of 
this effect is contingent on the specific formal and informal institutions of the home 
country. Essay II focuses on the relationship between corporate governance and 
international diversification (CG-ID). The study utilizes a multidimensional 
conceptualization of the two constructs, exploring breadth and depth of ID and several 
mechanisms of CG (e.g., ownership concentration, CEO compensation, and board 
independence). Drawing on agency theory and the resource and information-processing 
perspectives, we propose bidirectional causal effects between CG and ID. Our arguments 
are then contextualized by exploring the moderating effect of home-country institutional 
and cultural conditions and, in particular, the legal protection of minority shareholders 
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and the national uncertainty avoidance. We test the model using meta-analytic structural 
equation modeling (MASEM) with data from 104 primary studies across 28 countries 
covering the 1970-2012 period and find overall support for our theoretical predictions. 
The dissertation contributes to the literatures of global strategy and corporate governance 
and provides valuable insights to the practice of international business. 
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INTRODUCTION
Business landscapes are increasingly global. Over the last quarter of a century, world FDI 
outward stock has dramatically increased (from 2,254 billion of dollars in 1990 to 25,875 
in 2014) and country investment policy measures around the world have been geared to 
promote cross-border investment to an ever-larger extent. In this scenario, constantly 
advancing our understanding of the implications of international diversification is a 
paramount objective for both scholars and practitioners. Equally important is the 
investigation of the factors potentially affecting cross-border investment decisions, given 
the complex competitive and economic cost-benefit trade-off characterizing international 
diversification. Indeed, the determinants and consequences of international diversification 
have drawn significant attention in the strategy and international business literatures. 
Research has investigated antecedents at the individual, group, firm, industry, and 
country level of analysis, as well as outcomes at the firm and country level of analysis. 
This dissertation extends the extant literature on the determinants and consequences of 
international diversification with two empirical essays. 
Essay I focuses on the relationship between international diversification and firm 
performance (ID-P). Understanding the performance consequences of international 
diversification is widely recognized as a seminal issue in strategic management, given the 
increasingly global nature of firms’ strategic focus and actions. Over the past four 
decades, numerous empirical studies in management and international business have 
examined the performance implications of international diversification and found 
2 
 
positive, negative and non-significant linear effects as well as a variety of curvilinear 
relations. This inconclusive empirical evidence suggests that far from having reached a 
mature understanding of the ID-P relationship, the field is yet to fully understand this 
complex phenomenon. 
Drawing on the global strategy literature and the institution-based view of 
strategy, we propose that the mixed findings of extant research on the ID-P relationship 
can be explained by the contextual conditions in which this relationship exists, including 
home-country formal and informal institutions. The model is tested in a meta-analysis 
(HOMA, MARA, and HiLLMA analyses) of firm-, industry-, and home country-level 
factors driving the ID-P relationship. The sample consists of 359 primary studies across 
32 countries between 1972 and 2012—the largest sample of primary studies of any meta-
analysis on this topic to date. The main finding is that international diversification 
positively impacts firm performance, although the overall effect is small and its 
magnitude is contingent on the specific formal and informal institutions of the home 
country. 
We make three main contributions to the global strategy literatures. First, we 
develop a novel integration of the theoretical perspectives from the ID-P research and the 
institution-based view of strategy to explain how embeddedness in home-country 
institutions affects the strength of the ID-P relationship. Second, we show the importance 
of including both formal and informal institutions in analyses of firms’ institutional 
embeddedness, thereby extending our knowledge of the effects of institutional 
complexity. Our third contribution is methodological and reflects our use of advanced 
meta-analytical techniques based on both product-moment and partial correlations as 
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effect sizes, which allow us to address unresolved debates about the sign and shape of the 
ID-P relationship. 
Essay II focuses on the relationship between corporate governance and 
international diversification (CG-ID). From a theoretical point of view, corporate 
governance scholars suggest that governance mechanisms may affect the extent of 
international diversification. By contrast, the international management literature 
suggests that expansion abroad, through multiple theoretical mechanisms, may trigger 
changes in firms’ corporate governance framework. The literature, indeed, provides 
evidence for both causality directions. For example, research corroborates the argument 
that firms’ degree of international diversification both affects and is affected by the level 
of contingent executive pay. Similarly, some scholars show that the extent of foreign 
expansion has an effect on the proportion of outside directors, while others provide 
evidence that board independence impacts export propensity. Likewise, the literature, on 
the one hand, shows that board size influences the firm’s degree of international 
diversification and, on the other hand, provides empirical support for the opposite 
causality direction―from firms’ degree of foreign expansion to board size. Besides the 
direction of causality, the sign of the relationship between corporate governance and 
international diversification also receives mixed empirical evidence. Some scholars report 
a positive correlation between the level of ownership concentration and the extent of 
international diversification, while others provide evidence for a negative correlation. 
Similarly, research shows both a positive and a negative correlation between CEO duality 
and the degree of foreign expansion. 
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Extant research therefore, from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective, 
does not provide definitive answer as to the nature (i.e., direction, magnitude, and sign) 
of the CG-ID relationship. Moreover, extant research is somewhat lacking in the 
exploration of the theoretical mechanisms linking corporate governance and international 
diversification. In order to have a more impactful research on the CG-ID relationship, it is 
critical to develop a more fine-grained understanding of which mechanisms are at play 
and how they operate. 
Hence, there is an opportunity for further research, which may push forward the 
existing theoretical knowledge about the relationship between corporate governance and 
international diversification. This dissertation utilizes a multidimensional 
conceptualization of the two constructs, exploring breadth and depth of ID and several 
mechanisms of CG (e.g., ownership concentration, CEO compensation, and board 
independence). Drawing on agency theory and the resource and information-processing 
perspectives, we shed new light on such relationship in three major ways. First, we 
investigate each direction of causality and the theoretical mechanisms at play. Second, we 
examine the relative explanatory power of the two alternative cause-effect linkages 
between corporate governance and international diversification. Third, we contextualize 
our analysis by exploring the moderating effect of institutional and cultural conditions in 
the home country including the legal protection of minority shareholders and the national 
uncertainty avoidance. 
We test the model using meta-analytic structural equation modeling (MASEM) 
with data from 104 primary studies across 28 countries covering the 1970-2012 period 
and four main findings emerge. First, the causal relationship between corporate 
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governance and international diversification is bidirectional and multifaceted in nature. 
Second, corporate governance explains the degree of international diversification better 
than international diversification explains the activation of corporate governance 
mechanisms. Third, the nature of the causal linkages between corporate governance and 
international diversification changes depending on whether the focus is on the depth or 
breadth of foreign expansion. Fourth, both directions of causality in the CG-ID 
relationship are moderated by country-level contingencies including legal shareholder 
protection and uncertainty avoidance. 
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ESSAY 1
 
HOME COUNTRY INSTITUTIONS AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION-
PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP: A META-ANALYTIC REVIEW 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the performance consequences of internationalization is widely 
recognized as a seminal issue in strategic management (e.g., Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, & 
Connelly, 2006b; Kirca et al., 2011; Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1994), given the 
increasingly global nature of firms’ strategic focus and actions (Hill & Hult, 2015; Hitt et 
al., 2006b).1 Over the past four decades, numerous empirical studies in management and 
international business (IB) have examined the performance effects of internationalization 
and found positive, negative and non-significant linear effects as well as a variety of 
curvilinear relations (see Hitt et al., 2006b). This inconclusive empirical evidence 
suggests that far from having reached a mature understanding of the internationalization-
performance (I-P) relationship, the field is yet to “fully grasp this complex phenomenon” 
(Wiersema & Bowen, 2011: 154; see also: Cardinal, Miller, & Palich, 2011; Hennart, 
2011). We argue that the empirical inconsistencies in the existing research on the I-P 
                                                            
1 We rely on Hitt, Ireland, and Hoskisson’s (2007: 251) definition of internationalization as “a strategy 
through which a firm expands the sales of its goods or services across the borders of global regions and 
countries into different geographic locations or markets”. Terms such as “internationalization”, 
“international diversification”, “geographic diversification”, “international expansion”, “globalization”, 
“multinationality” and “degree of internationalization” are often used to refer to the same phenomenon 
(Hitt et al., 2006b; Kirca et al., 2011); thus, we use them interchangeably. 
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relationship stem primarily from its failure to adequately consider the moderating effects 
of firms’ home country formal and informal institutions. 
The limited attention paid to the role of home country formal and informal 
institutions on the I-P relationship is surprising, given that IB research has firmly 
established the importance of home country institutions for firms’ global strategy (e.g., 
Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008) – also referred to as the “country of origin” effect (COE) 
(e.g., Elango & Sethi, 2007; Harzing & Sorge, 2003; Noorderhaven & Harzing, 2003). 
Still, there has been little effort to determine which home country institutions influence 
the I-P relationship, or the mechanisms underlying these effects (Pajunen, 2008: 653). 
Most empirical works on the I-P relationship, including existing meta-analyses (e.g., 
Kirca, Roth, Hult, & Cavusgil, 2012a), have either taken home country institutions as a 
given, examined only institutional distances between home and host country, or relied on 
a narrow conceptualization of the home country institutional context by using dummy 
variables or focusing on a single institutional characteristic (e.g., Geringer et al., 1989; Li 
& Yue, 2008). One important exception is Wan and Hoskisson’s (2003) study, which 
develops a multifaceted conceptualization of the home country institutional context and 
its moderating effect on the I-P relationship. Further, very few studies have examined 
how multiple home country institutions shape the I-P relationship across a large number 
of countries and years (Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2013). Thus, existing findings 
may not generalize to sets of “different institutions and to a broader spectrum of 
countries” (Holmes et al., 2013: 533).  
This study addresses these limitations both theoretically and empirically. 
Theoretically, we draw on the institution-based view and COE traditions in strategic 
8 
 
management to explain how home country formal and informal institutions shape the I-P 
relationship (e.g., Carney, Gedajlovic, Heugens, Van Essen, & Van Oosterhout, 2011; 
Elango & Sethi, 2007; Harzing & Sorge, 2003; Peng et al., 2008; Van Essen, Heugens, 
Otten, & Van Oosterhout, 2012; Wan & Hoskisson 2003). Specifically, we view home 
country contexts as complex, multifaceted institutional environments that provide the 
foundational social structures, and thereby create templates for organizational action 
(North, 1990). Home country institutions are the central components of national business, 
governance and innovation systems (Henisz & Williamson, 1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993; Whitley, 1992). 
Therefore, they play a critical role in firms’ ability to develop and maintain their 
competitive advantage at home and abroad by shaping managerial cognition and by 
enabling or constraining the acquisition and deployment of strategic resources and 
capabilities (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). 
Empirically, we use advanced meta-analytic techniques (e.g., Carney et al., 2011; 
Van Essen, Otten, & Carberry, 2015) to combine numerous single-country studies into a 
single multi-country study, thereby maximizing the number and diversity of the home 
country contexts under examination to test our hypotheses about the effects of home 
country institutions on the I-P relationship. Specifically, our meta-analytic tests combine 
359 studies from across the management, economics and finance disciplines – a 
significant improvement from existing meta-analyses on the I-P relationship (i.e., Bausch 
& Krist, 2007; Kirca et al., 2011; Kirca et al., 2012a; Ruigrok & Wagner, 2004; Yang & 
Driffield, 2012), which respectively included 36, 111, 141, 62 and 54 studies. 
Furthermore, our study covers the years from 1972 to 2012 and a larger number of firm-
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year observations (1,558,455 firm observations for the bivariate analyses and 2,576,772 
firm-year observations for the partial analyses) and countries (i.e., 32) than any previous 
meta-analysis on this topic.  
Our results show that internationalization has an overall positive, but small, effect 
on performance, albeit with substantial variation in the effect size distribution depending 
on firms’ countries of origin. Firms in some countries experience significant negative 
performance effects from their internationalization efforts (e.g., in Mexico), while in 
others internationalization generates significant positive effects that range from very 
small (e.g., in South Korea) to sizable (e.g., in Greece), or no effects (e.g., in the 
Netherlands and Spain). Further, we find that specific home country institutions have 
different effects on the I-P relationship. In particular, our results show that home country 
quality of business regulations, political risk, generalized trust, long-term orientation and 
uncertainty avoidance are all moderators of the I-P relationship.  
This research makes three main contributions to the global strategy literature. 
First, we show that, in the aggregate, the positive linear association between 
internationalization and performance is modest, and should be considered only as a 
“stylized fact” (Helfat, 2007). We also show that this relationship is contingent on home 
country institutional conditions, which can significantly affect the magnitude and sign of 
this relationship. Taken together, these results indicate that studies of the I-P relationship 
should account for COE; if not, they are likely to be underspecified both theoretically and 
empirically. Relatedly, our findings show the relevance of the institution-based view of 
strategy for studying the I-P relationship. In particular, they suggest that home country 
institutions influence firms’ transaction costs and their managers’ cognitive processes, 
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which, in turn, affect their ability to acquire and deploy strategic resources (Kirca, 
Jayachandran, & Bearden, 2005), and, ultimately, their potential to succeed in markets at 
home and abroad. To date, research has largely overlooked the importance of the 
institution-based view for contextualizing the I-P relationship. Second, we show that 
multiple formal and informal institutions across many countries, over a long period of 
time, affect firms’ ability to benefit from internationalization, contributing to research on 
institutional complexity (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011). 
In doing so, our study provides a richer assessment of how firms’ institutional 
embeddedness in their home country affects their effectiveness in international markets. 
Our third contribution is methodological and pertains to our meta-analytical tests’ use of 
both Pearson product-moment correlation and partial correlation as effect sizes, which 
represents a significant improvement from existing meta-analyses that only used Pearson 
product-moment correlations. Incorporating partial correlations allows us to generate 
conclusive findings on several important matters that could not be properly addressed by 
previous meta-analyses, including the sign and shape of the I-P relationship (Stanley & 
Doucouliagos, 2012).   
The paper is organized as follows. We begin with a review of the literature, 
focusing on the mixed findings about the sign and shape of the I-P relationship and 
previous attempts at reconciling them. We also identify firm-, industry- and host country-
level variables that have been deemed important in existing tests of the I-P relationship. 
Then, we develop our central arguments based on the institution-based view to explain 
how the home country institutional context shapes the I-P relationship. We focus on the 
role of home countries’ formal and informal institutions in enabling or constraining 
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firms’ global competitive advantage. We also provide some specific examples of home 
country formal and informal institutions that are relevant for the I-P relationship. Next, 
we explain the meta-analytic methodology employed, data, and results. Finally, we 
conclude with a discussion of our results and a number of avenues for future research on 
the I-P relationship and the institution-based view in strategy. These suggestions point to 
other scarcely researched factors that might also affect firms’ ability to generate profits 
from their internationalization efforts, steps needed to further strengthen the 
methodological rigor of the empirical research on the focal relationship, and ways in 
which theoretical insights from the institution-based view can further advance research in 
this area.  
THE PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONALIZATION 
A considerable body of research has focused on the performance implications of 
internationalization. Several review articles (Cardinal et al., 2011; Hennart, 2011; Hitt et 
al., 2006b; Matysiak & Bausch, 2012; Oesterle & Richta, 2013) and meta-analyses 
(Bausch & Krist, 2007; Kirca et al., 2011; Kirca, Hult, Deligonul, Perryy, & Cavusgil, 
2012b; Yang & Driffield, 2012) have presented overviews of research on this topic, as 
well as critical assessments of the main theoretical arguments used to explain the I-P 
relationship (Hennart, 2007). Rather than providing another comprehensive review of the 
vast literature on the I-P relationship, we focus instead on its central debates regarding 
the sign and shape of the central relationship, the role of various methodological and 
model specification artifacts that might explain the heterogeneous findings of this body of 
research, and recent attempts at reconciling these mixed findings.   
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Conflicting and Inconclusive Empirical Results 
Scholars acknowledge that internationalization is accompanied by inherent benefits 
(Geringer et al., 1989) as well as costs (Tallman & Li, 1996), which can produce different 
views about the performance effects of internationalization (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 
1997; Lu & Beamish, 2004). The positive effects are explained by economies of scale 
and scope, location-based advantages, international arbitrage, broader learning and 
market opportunities (Cardinal et al., 2011; Hennart, 2011; Hitt et al., 2006b). Costs 
result from the complexity of internationalization dynamics due to external (e.g., 
managing across more diverse countries, liabilities of foreignness) and internal (e.g., 
coordinating more foreign direct investments) factors (Hennart, 2011). Empirical results 
have been largely inconclusive on the existence and shape of the I-P relationship, 
providing support for positive linear relationships (e.g., Grant, Jamine, & Thomas, 1988; 
Kim, Hwang & Burgers, 1989), negative linear relationships (Siddharthan & Lall, 1982; 
Wan & Hoskisson, 2003), no relationships (Hennart, 2007, 2011), U-shaped relationships 
(Lu & Beamish, 2001), inverted U-shaped relationships (Geringer et al., 1989; Gomes & 
Ramaswamy, 1999; Hitt et al., 1997), and sigmoid relationships (Contractor, Kundu, & 
Hsu, 2003; Lu & Beamish, 2004).  
Advocates of the positive linear relationship focus on the benefits of 
internationalization. This approach has been criticized because it often ignores the 
fundamental complexity of internationalization (Cardinal et al., 2011). More complex 
non-linear relationships have been proposed to reflect both the costs and benefits of 
internationalization. Proponents of a U-shaped I-P relationship (e.g., Lu & Beamish, 
2001) argue that firm performance is likely to decline in the early phases of 
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internationalization due to the costs stemming from the liabilities of foreignness and 
newness (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995). However, over time as the firm continues to 
internationalize, it acquires sufficient knowledge and capabilities to overcome these 
difficulties and capture the benefits associated with internationalization. Thus, its 
performance improves over time. Proponents of the inverted U-shaped relationship (e.g., 
Geringer et al., 1989; Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999), instead, emphasize the positive 
effects of internationalization up to an “internationalization threshold”, where the costs of 
coordination among diverse subsidiaries exceed the benefits. Thus, according to this 
view, firms are expected to enjoy better performance at moderate levels of 
internationalization, but experience poorer performance at low and high levels of 
internationalization. Finally, other researchers (e.g., Contractor et al., 2003; Lu & 
Beamish, 2004; Thomas & Eden, 2004) propose a sigmoid I-P relationship in an effort to 
synthesize the arguments made by the proponents of both the U-shaped and inverted U-
shaped relationships. Similarly to the advocates of the U-shaped relationship, they 
suggest that firm performance is likely to deteriorate in the early phases of 
internationalization, but then improve at later stages. However, negative performance 
effects are also likely to develop when the firms internationalize beyond a certain 
threshold, as suggested by the proponents of the inverted U-shaped relationship. Sigmoid 
models are thus described as more sophisticated and integrative by their authors because 
they account for the impact of internationalization on performance at different levels of 
internationalization. 
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Reconciling Conflicting and Inconclusive Results 
Conflicting findings about the sign and shape of the I-P relationship have triggered 
several attempts to explain them. They can be broadly summarized in two groups. The 
first group includes studies examining the impact of various methodological approaches 
on the I-P relationship (see Bowen, 2007), such as differences in the time frames 
examined, endogeneity controls, and operationalizations of the main variables of interest. 
For example, Thomas and Eden (2004) show the different effects of internationalization 
on short-term accounting measures of performance (e.g., return on assets, return on 
equity, and return on sales) and long-term market-based measures (e.g., excess market 
value, average market value). They find a stronger S-shaped effect in studies that rely on 
market-based measures of performance. However, conflicting results can also be found in 
studies relying purely on market-based measures (Hitt et al., 2006b). Another 
methodological concern stems from the numerous approaches to measuring 
internationalization as they capture different aspects of this phenomenon (Hennart, 2011; 
Thomas & Eden, 2004). For example, while many studies measure firm’s 
internationalization in terms of its “scale” (or “depth” – e.g., ratio of foreign sales to total 
sales, foreign assets to total assets, or foreign employees to total employees), others rely 
on measures that reflect “scope” (or “breadth” – e.g., number of countries, international 
asset dispersion). These measures consider two different facets of firms’ 
internationalization. Scale reflects the strategic importance that a firm assigns to serving 
foreign markets (Stopford & Wells, 1972); however, scope captures the heterogeneity of 
internationalization across countries (Goerzen & Beamish, 2003; Tallman & Li, 1996). 
Scope of internationalization can also help to explain the different non-linear 
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relationships between internationalization and performance as it captures the potential 
costs of internationalization. Firms with institutionally diverse portfolios of foreign 
operations (i.e., with a larger scope of internationalization) are likely to experience 
substantial complexity in their operations, given the need to manage operations across 
countries with dissimilar institutional profiles (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Zahra, Ireland, 
& Hitt, 2000). A larger scope of internationalization can also complicate the exploitation 
of firm-specific assets (Rugman & Verbeke, 2005), thus negatively affecting 
performance. To include both aspects of internationalization, some studies have 
developed multidimensional measures of internationalization (e.g., Hitt, Bierman, 
Uhlenbruck, & Shimizu, 2006a; Sullivan, 1994).  
A second group of studies attempts to reconcile the conflicting findings of the I-P 
literature by focusing on potential theory-driven moderators of the relationship (e.g., 
Bausch & Krist, 2007; Bowen, 2007; Hitt et al., 2006b). In addition to industry-level 
moderating effects (e.g., Tallman & Li, 1996), a number of firm-level moderators have 
been examined in the literature. Some of the most common ones include the degree of 
product diversification (Hitt et al., 1997), size (Dragun, 2002), ownership type (Allen & 
Pantzalis, 1996), leverage (Reuer & Miller, 1997), risk (Hejazi & Santor, 2010), growth 
(Allen & Pantzalis, 1996), firm-specific intangible assets such as marketing and R&D 
assets (Kirca et al., 2011), advertising intensity (Kim & Lyn, 1986), CEO pay or 
international experience (Carpenter & Sanders, 2004), top management team’s (TMT’s) 
international experience or diversity (Thomas, 2005), and human capital in the case of 
service industries (Hitt et al., 2006a). However, the empirical results of some of these 
moderating effects are not always consistent.  
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Researchers have also examined how differences in firms’ internationalization 
processes, in terms of pace (i.e., the speed with which it is carried out) and rhythm (i.e., 
the irregularity of the internationalization process) influence performance. For example, 
using a sample of Dutch firms, Vermeulen and Barkema (2002) show that faster and 
more irregular internationalization processes negatively moderate the I-P relationship. 
However, Chang and Rhee (2011), using Korean data, find an insignificant relationship 
between internationalization rhythm and performance. They also show that greater speed 
enhances performance only in industries in which globalization pressures are high, and 
when they are carried out by firms with superior international resources and capabilities.2 
It is important to note that research on the performance implications of heterogeneous 
processes of internationalization is still limited when compared to other areas of inquiry 
reviewed herein.  
Other studies rely on the construct of institutional distance and its impact on the I-
P relationship (e.g., Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russell, 2005). Institutional distance refers to the 
“difference/similarity between the regulatory, cognitive, and normative institutional 
environments of the home and host countries” of a multinational enterprise (MNE) 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999: 68). Empirical studies have shown both positive and negative 
moderating effects of institutional distance on the I-P relationship (e.g., Chao & Kumar, 
2010; Tihanyi et al., 2005). For example, Tihanyi et al. (2005) find support for a positive 
effect of cultural distance on performance, but only for MNEs entering developed 
countries. Chao and Kumar (2010) also find that cultural distance is positively related to 
MNE’s performance, however the effect for regulatory distance is negative. Some 
researchers have also examined the overall quality of the institutional environment across 
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all of the MNE’s portfolio of host countries, arguing that weaker institutional contexts are 
more likely to increase the firm’s costs associated with “entry and liabilities of 
foreignness and newness owing to unclear regulations and weak enforcement of the 
rules” (Chao & Kumar, 2010: 95). 
MODERATING ROLE OF HOME COUNTRY INSTITUTIONS 
Attempts to reconcile mixed findings of the I-P relationship have examined a variety of 
firm-, industry-, and host country-level factors, but scarce attention has been paid to the 
role of firms’ home country institutional environments. This is surprising given the 
existing view that home country institutions help shape firms’ strategies and their ability 
to succeed at home and abroad by influencing their transaction costs and their managers’ 
cognitive processes. In particular, scholars have argued that home country institutions 
engaging efficiency and uncertainty reduction mechanisms often determine the cost of 
transacting internationally, and thereby affect firm performance. For example, Cuervo-
Cazurra (2011) argues that home country institutions affect firms’ domestic and global 
performance because the “presence or absence of specific inputs outside the firm induces 
it to develop distinct resources that either rely on the availability of particular external 
inputs or compensate for the lack of certain external inputs […]” (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011: 
383). In addition, “the particular norms and institutions prevailing in the country induce 
the company to develop specific resources to be able to interact with other players in the 
marketplace […]” (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011: 383). Others have explored country of origin 
effects through the concept of national administrative heritage, which refers to shared 
beliefs and cultural templates that determine "how things ought to be done" and 
legitimize ways of organizing and controlling (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Elango & Sethi, 
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2007; Lubatkin, Calori, Very, & Veiga, 1998; Noorderhaven & Harzing, 2003). The 
concept of national administrative heritage builds on the rich and theoretically eclectic 
body of work on the institutional embeddedness of firms’ behaviors (e.g., DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Guillén, 1994; Lubatkin et al., 1998). McGahan and Victer (2010) rely on 
the related concept of employees’ imprinting reflecting their absorption of home country-
based cognitive frames.  
An important exception to the limited empirical attention given to the moderating 
role of home country institutions on the I-P relationship is Wan and Hoskisson’s study 
(2003), which examines the political, legal and societal institutions of a firm’s home 
country. The authors find that stronger formal and informal institutions positively 
moderate the I-P relationship. Our study builds on Wan and Hoskisson’s (2003) insights 
by examining the role that home country formal and informal institutions play as 
moderators of the I-P relationship. Our overarching contention is that, keeping other 
factors constant, the strength of the I-P relationship will vary depending on firms’ home 
country institutional environment (Andersson, Cuervo-Cazurra, & Nielsen, 2014), as it 
generates conditions that push them to develop resources and capabilities that can sustain 
or hinder their global competitive advantage (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Wan & Hoskisson, 
2003).  
To further illustrate our general contention, we draw on the institution-based view 
and COE tradition in strategy. We focus on institutional variables that the institution-
based view and COE traditions in strategy have identified as potentially influential for 
firms’ global strategy. Even though the majority of the arguments presented below have 
not been empirically examined before, we do not present institution-specific hypotheses. 
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The rationale for this approach is two-pronged. First, we are interested in examining the 
overarching contention that home country formal and informal institutions are important 
moderators of the I-P relationship, rather than exploring in detail the role of specific 
institutions. Second, our set of institutional variables should not be viewed as definitive, 
nor do we explore the theoretical linkages among those variables. Rather, our goal is to 
propose (based on theory) and test (benefiting from the advantages of advanced meta-
analytic methods) promising institutional arguments that are consistent with our general 
hypothesis. We view our approach as exploratory and consistent with Cantwell, Dunning 
and Lundan’s (2010) appreciative theory, which aims to create “an analytical bridge 
between empirical investigation and formal models” (Cantwell et al., 2010: 573).  
We draw on North’s institutional tradition and consider the impact of two 
different but related types of home country institutions: formal and informal (Holmes et 
al., 2013; Van Essen et al., 2012). Formal institutions consist of regulatory, 
administrative, economic and political arrangements that detail the actions of people, 
systems, and organizations through formal laws, regulations, policies, and other written 
materials as well as their means of enforcement (North, 1990). Informal institutions are 
norms and beliefs that are not codified or documented; rather, they are durable systems of 
shared meanings and understandings that contribute to shape societal structures and 
behaviors (Holmes et al., 2013).  
Formal Institutions and the I-P Relationship  
Because formal institutions reflect codified and explicit rules and standards, they provide 
influential behavioral guidelines within society mainly through regulatory and political 
structures (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). A large number of empirical studies examine the 
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influence of various aspects of home countries’ formal institutions on firms’ behavior and 
performance (e.g., Chacar, Newburry, & Vissa, 2010; Kirca et al., 2012b; McGahan & 
Victer, 2010; Van Essen et al., 2012; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). In reviewing the 
literature on formal institutions’ effect on a firm’s global strategy, we follow Holmes et 
al. (2013) who argue that the most relevant formal institutions for managers are 
regulatory/legal, economic, and political institutions. Much of the research on these 
institutions has emphasized that their quality stimulates firms’ creation of specific 
resources that rely on particular external inputs or compensate for the lack of other inputs 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). 
Research on legal institutions shows that the degree to which legal traditions 
prioritize investor and private property rights helps explain cross-country variation in 
financial development and corporate strategies (La Porta et al., 1998). Common law 
systems provide stronger protection to both shareholders and creditors (La Porta et al., 
1998). Building on these ideas, Li and Yue (2008) test and find support for the notion that 
firms from civil law countries achieve better performance in their international operations 
than their common law counterparts. The authors attribute this outcome to civil law 
countries’ less supportive legal environment, which forces local firms to develop coping 
skills and capabilities that help them compete against their common law counterparts in 
the global arena (Elango & Sethi, 2007; Li & Yue, 2008). In sum, these findings imply 
that civil law home country traditions are likely to positively moderate the I-P 
relationship. 
Home country’s business regulations, including antitrust and product liability 
regulations, contract enforcement, and financial market oversight, have also been found 
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to shape local firms’ access to resources and thus to influence their ability to compete in 
the international arena (Chacar et al., 2010; Nachum, 2004; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). 
Two conflicting perspectives have emerged in this area with regard to how these 
institutions can shape firms’ performance abroad. The first one suggests that higher 
quality business regulations enable local firms’ economic activities because they reduce 
firms’ transactions costs by limiting opportunistic behaviors and uncertainty in market 
transactions. These regulations produce stronger national economies that provide more 
resources, which in turn help firms to develop skills and routines that can strengthen their 
ability to profit from their foreign operations (Chacar et al., 2010; Kirca et al., 2012b; 
Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). Hence, these arguments suggest that home country quality of 
government’s business regulations positively moderates the I-P relationship. The second 
and conflicting perspective comes from the research on institutional voids (i.e., weak or 
missing institutions) and firm performance (e.g., Khanna & Palepu, 1997). It contends 
that weaker business regulations at home stimulate local firms’ development of coping 
skills, which can be deployed in their foreign operations and translated into competitive 
advantages over firms from countries with stronger regulations (Luo & Tung, 2007: 486). 
Therefore, this perspective views home country quality of government’s business 
regulations as likely to negatively moderate firms’ ability to benefit from 
internationalization. 
Research also suggests that the political system in an MNE’s home country can 
affect the I-P relationship. Relative to autocratic regimes, democratic political systems 
create more effective economies, more cooperative relationships between businesses and 
governments, and higher levels of transparency due to the large number of influential and 
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informed stakeholders embedded within them (Hillman & Keim, 1995). Democratic 
political systems also decrease the level of political risk in a country. By political risk, we 
refer to the potential for arbitrary and capricious policymaking, which creates uncertainty 
for firms (Henisz & Zelner, 2004). Lower levels of political risk can improve 
performance by reducing uncertainty and enabling firms to identify and conform to 
government priorities and facilitate relationships with government officials (Orr & 
Kennedy, 2008). Two competing theoretical logics have emerged regarding the role of 
political risk relative to firm’s performance that are similar to some of the arguments 
discussed above for business regulations. For example, Wan and Hoskisson (2003) show 
that firms headquartered in countries with stronger political institutions (which they 
examined together with “legal” and “societal” institutions) tend to profit more from 
internationalization than firms from countries with less strong institutions. They argue 
that the latter group of firms may “lack globally redeployable capabilities for successfully 
competing in foreign markets” (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003: 31). This is because their 
competitive advantages usually depend on the lax home country institutional environment 
and thus are “in many respects local and [...] likely to dissipate in foreign countries” (32). 
However, others provide competing arguments. For example, Puffer, McCarthy and 
Boisot (2010) argue that while countries characterized by unstable and unpredictable 
political systems are prone to market inefficiencies, such conditions force firms to 
develop coping strategies and capabilities to deal with difficult institutional settings. In 
turn, these coping skills can help firms manage the challenges they experience in their 
foreign operations (Elango & Sethi, 2007). This second perspective emphasizes the 
positive effects of weak home country institutions (Khanna & Palepu, 1997) for firms 
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when they internationalize: thus, it suggests that home country political risk should 
positively moderate the I-P relationship. 
Informal Institutions and the I-P Relationship  
Culture is an important informal institution in a country (North, 1990; Peng et al., 2008). 
Culture is composed of interrelated values and norms (Hofstede, 2001; Parsons & Shils, 
1951), as well as repertoires, worldviews, stories, and symbols that people use to 
determine strategies for action (Swidler, 1986). Culture is durable and provides a tacit 
context for the development of formal institutions (Dunning & Bansal, 1997; Holmes et 
al., 2013). A number of empirical studies have shown the impact of national culture on 
firms’ administrative heritage (Lubatkin et al., 1998) and performance (Li, Lam, & Qian, 
2001). National culture can affect managers’ ability to interpret and respond to strategic 
issues (Schneider & De Meyer, 1991), leadership style, human resource management and 
other organizational practices (Harzing & Sorge, 2003; House et al., 1999), which in turn 
influence a firm’s ability to acquire and deploy strategic resources (Kirca et al., 2005). IB 
research has examined how specific dimensions of national cultures affect firm 
performance; hence, studying culture can help understand cross-country performance 
variation. Based on an extensive review of the relevant literature, we identify three facets 
of home country culture that are most likely to moderate the I-P relationship: generalized 
trust, future orientation, and uncertainty avoidance.  
Research shows that higher levels of home country societal trust, cooperative 
norms, and relational activities enable firms to extract greater value from their 
international operations (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). This is because societies with higher 
levels of trust have stronger cooperative norms that propel economic actors to work 
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towards collective benefits (Knack & Keefer, 1997). International strategies have been 
linked to a specific type of social trust referred as “generalized trust” (Kramer & Lewicki, 
2010; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) and defined as the degree to which a country’s 
population perceives people from foreign countries to be trustworthy (Ertug, Cuypers, 
Noorderhaven, & Bensaou, 2013). Generalized trust reflects a social categorization effect 
in that assumptions or stereotypes associated with membership in a social category (e.g., 
a foreign country) affect how much trust is afforded to members of that group (Kramer & 
Lewicki, 2010). Generalized trust is part of a country’s national culture (Ertug et al., 
2013) and varies across countries (Ferrin & Gillespie, 2010; Huff & Kelley, 2003). In 
addition to shaping local firms’ managerial practices (Calori, Lubatkin, Very, & Veiga, 
1997; Ertug et al., 2013), it is especially relevant for internationalization strategies (e.g., 
Ertug et al., 2013). Indeed, higher generalized trust translates into firms’ greater openness 
to foreign activities and practices (Huff & Kelley, 2003; Yamagishi, Cook, & Watabe, 
1998), as well as a stronger learning orientation in foreign markets (Yilmaz, Alpkan, & 
Ergun, 2005). By extension, this stronger openness to foreign activities and markets and 
heightened learning orientations can lead to greater propensity to develop relevant 
practices, skills and routines that foster firms’ ability to succeed abroad (Chen, Meindl, & 
Hui, 1998; Yilmaz et al., 2005; Zahra et al., 2000). Hence, these arguments indicate that 
home country generalized trust positively moderates the I-P relationship. 
Other facets of home countries’ cultural systems may also be relevant for the I-P 
relationship. For example, research suggests that the degree of the home country’s future 
orientation (Hofstede, 2001) affects firms’ entrepreneurialism and performance (e.g., Li 
et al., 2001). Future orientation suggests an emphasis on long-term rather than short-term 
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outcomes; hence, planning and investing activities are geared towards long-term 
outcomes (Ashkanasy, Gupta, Mayfield, & Trevor-Roberts, 2004). Prevalent social 
norms, such as delayed gratification, prompt individuals and organizations to opt for 
savings and forgo immediate spending. Ultimately, this enables capital accumulation 
through investments in projects with long-term payoffs and the avoidance of expenditures 
associated with short-term payoffs (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). Future orientation exists in 
cultures that place a premium on loyalties and commitment, and the extension of familial 
values to corporate settings (Ouchi, 1981). Future orientation may have an impact on the 
supply and demand of capital by framing a country’s investment options as long-term 
growth-opportunities. Thus, these ideas suggest that a country’s cultural emphasis on 
future orientation could enhance its firms’ ability to extract value from foreign 
investments/operations. 
Finally, research points to one other facet of the home country’s cultural system 
that is relevant for the I-P relationship, namely the degree of home country’s uncertainty 
avoidance (Noorderhaven & Harzing, 2003). Uncertainty avoidance reflects the degree to 
which individuals within a culture are tolerant of uncertain situations. Individuals and 
organizations embedded in cultures with high degrees of uncertainty avoidance tend to be 
more easily threatened by ambiguous situations, and prefer structures, regulations and 
expert knowledge that mitigate risk (Hofstede, 2001). However, these preferences tend to 
create cognitive constraints that limit a firm’s strategic flexibility (Brinckmann, Girchnik, 
& Kapsa, 2010; Lubatkin et al., 1998). In turn, the lack of strategic flexibility can harm 
firms’ ability to learn from their exposure to international markets and ultimately reduce 
their ability to extract rents from them (Mosakowski, 1997). Instead, firms headquartered 
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in countries with lower uncertainty avoidance may have better responsiveness, strategic 
flexibility and tolerance for improvisational activities that help them to adapt to and 
perform more effectively within the requirements and expectations of foreign local 
conditions, thereby enhancing their chances for success in foreign markets (Brinckmann 
et al., 2010). Thus, home country uncertainty avoidance should negatively moderate the 
I-P relationship. 
METHODOLOGY 
In order to develop a systematic empirical evaluation of the firm-, industry-, home and 
host country-level factors driving the I-P relationship that were discussed in the preceding 
sections, we conducted a meta-analytic study following established methodological 
guidelines (e.g., Buckley, Devinney, & Tang, 2013). In this section, after describing our 
sample and coding approach, we discuss our three main meta-analytic approaches, 
namely Hedges and Olkin-type meta-analytic techniques (HOMA; Hedges & Olkin, 1985); 
meta-analytic regression analysis (MARA; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001); and hierarchical linear 
modeling meta-analysis (HiLMMA; Hox, 2002; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). We 
conclude this section by describing our measurement approach. 
Sample and Coding 
To identify the highest possible number of studies testing the I-P relationship, we used 
five search strategies. First, we consulted several review articles (e.g., Hennart, 2011; Hitt 
et al., 2006b; Li, 2007) and six prior meta-analytic articles (Bausch & Krist, 2007; Kirca 
et al., 2011; Kirca et al., 2012b; Kirca et al., 2012b; Ruigrok & Wagner, 2004; Yang & 
Driffield, 2012). Second, we explored five major electronic databases using the following 
search terms: “multinationality”, “MNC”, “international diversification”, 
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“internationalization”, “geographic diversification”, “international expansion”, and 
“globalization” (Hitt et al., 2006b; Kirca et al., 2011; Kirca et al., 2012a, 2012b). Third, 
we conducted a manual search in journals across the disciplines of economics, 
entrepreneurship, management, and finance that have published articles on the I-P 
relationship from the year of the first publication of each of the journals to 2014. Fourth, 
after collecting an initial set of studies, we gathered all studies cited in the previously 
retrieved articles, along with all articles citing them, using Google Scholar and ISI Web of 
Knowledge. Fifth, we directly contacted researchers who had previously written one or 
several papers relevant to this topic but did not report effect size information or whose 
studies we could not retrieve by other means. We asked them for a correlation table, 
sample size, regression output, and additional empirical studies. Combined, these 
strategies yielded a final sample of 359 primary studies (288 published and 71 working 
papers) with samples of firms from 32 countries across the 1972-2012 time period. In 
Figure 1.1, we show the number of primary studies for each year included in our meta-
analysis and the growth trajectory of research on the I-P relationship.2 
We proceeded by reading all articles and by developing a coding protocol (Lipsey 
& Wilson, 2001) to extract data on all relevant variables and study characteristics. Two 
authors coded all the data, and a third author re-checked all effect sizes to assess the 
degree of agreement in the extracted information from primary studies (Stanley & 
Doucouliagos, 2012). We resolved remaining discrepancies via discussion until we 
reached a consensus. 
                                                            
2 We were not able to determine the year for eight working papers. Thus, those papers are not included in 
Figure 1.1. 
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Meta-analytic Procedures 
We used three analytical procedures depending on our research objectives. 
HOMA procedure. We use Hedges and Olkin-type meta-analytic techniques 
(HOMA; Hedges & Olkin, 1985) to measure the meta-analytic mean correlation between 
internationalization and performance and the corresponding confidence interval. In 
addition, this procedure allows us to assess whether the heterogeneity of the effect size 
distribution in the I-P relationship depends on the different operationalizations of the two 
main constructs of interest (i.e., internationalization and performance) and variations in the 
internationalization processes that firms pursue. It also enables us to examine the shape of 
the I-P relationship. To carry out HOMA analyses, we use both Pearson product-moment 
correlation r and the partial correlation rxy.z as effect sizes because these are easily 
interpretable and scale-free measures of linear association. We use r, as this is the most 
commonly reported effect size statistic in management (Geyskens, Krishnan, Steenkamp, 
& Cunha, 2009). In addition, we use rxy.z, which represents the association between I(X) 
and P(Y), given a set of n control variables (Z), and allows us to incorporate studies in 
which bivariate effect size information was not reported. Exploring partial correlations is 
useful for several additional reasons. First, rxy.z gives insights into the direction of 
causality between two variables, provided that the authors of the primary study corrected 
for endogeneity. Second, rxy.z controls for the effect of other variables and can be used to 
determine the minimally required set of control variables for future studies (see our 
discussion about the MARA technique below). Furthermore, it can also provide 
information about nonlinearity when the authors of primary studies have incorporated 
squared transformations of linear terms in their regression work. 
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When primary studies reported effect size statistics other than r and rxy.z, we 
transformed these to an r value. When we encountered multiple measurements of the 
focal effect, for example due to the reporting of results for several different 
operationalizations of internationalization, all effects were included in our overall analysis 
and we unpacked them later with subgroup analyses (Bijmolt & Pieters, 2001). 
MARA procedure. We use meta-analytic regression analysis (MARA; Lipsey & 
Wilson, 2001) to examine the impact of formal and informal institutions on the I-P 
relationship. Similar to multiple regression approaches, MARA estimates a linear 
regression model in which the dependent variable (in our case, the correlation between I-
P in a given primary sample) is regressed on a set of predictors (which are the potential 
moderators of the focal relationship) (Carney et al., 2011). We weight the effect sizes 
again by their inverse variance weight to account for differences in the precision of the 
information contained in them. We follow Van Essen et al. (2015) and a long tradition of 
meta-analytic research in economics (e.g., Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2012) and use r and 
rxy.z as our effect size estimates for the MARA procedure, which, in our case, captures the 
I-P relationship, with a given set of n control variables. One of the unique advantages of 
using MARA is that it allows modeling the variance in the effect size distribution in light 
of home country-level institutional variables that were not included in the primary studies 
(Van Essen, Van Oosterhout, & Heugens, 2013). The institutional variables are measured 
longitudinally, which allows us to match the individual effect sizes to the temporally 
closest available institutional variables. 
HiLMMA procedure. Finally, we rely on hierarchical linear modeling meta-
analysis (HiLMMA; Raudenbusch & Bryk, 2002) to assess whether primary study results 
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are consistent across countries, and if not, which percentage of the variability in the effect 
size contribution depends on a firm’s country of origin. We also use HiLMMA as a 
robustness check to rule out the possibility that stochastic dependencies between multiple 
effect sizes harvested from a single primary study biased our HOMA and MARA 
parameter estimates. Specifically, we interpret each effect size as a level 1 observation, 
nesting it in the study from which it was derived, and coding this study as a level 2 
predictor. If the intercept of the standardized HiLMMA test is comparable to the mean 
effect size retrieved by the HOMA test, it signals the absence of estimation bias due to 
stochastic dependencies. Inversely, a significant difference between the two values would 
indicate the presence of such biases. 
Measures of Performance and Internationalization 
Firm performance. Building on the findings by Hitt and colleagues (2006b), we 
include four types of firm-level performance measures: (1) accounting-based measures 
(e.g., Hitt et al., 1997; Thomas & Eden, 2004), such as ROE, ROA, ROS, ROI, profit 
margin, and profit; (2) market-based measures (e.g., Thomas & Eden, 2004), such as 
stock market performance, market to book value, Tobin’s Q, and excess market value; (3) 
sales growth (e.g., Zahra et al., 2000); and (4) survey-based measures (e.g., Dhanaraj & 
Beamish, 2003), which capture respondents’ perceptions of firm performance. 
Internationalization. Based on Sullivan (1994) and Thomas and Eden (2004), we 
include 11 internationalization variables grouped into five categories. (1) Depth of 
internationalization. We include the following measures of depth: foreign sales to total 
sales (Tallman & Li, 1996); foreign assets to total assets (Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999); 
foreign employees to total employees (Brock & Yaffe, 2008); and export to total sales 
(Lu & Beamish, 2001). Together, these ratios suggest the extent to which the firm’s 
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activities are conducted outside the home country (Thomas & Eden, 2004). (2) Breadth 
(scope) of internationalization. We include the following measures of breadth: number of 
countries (Delios & Beamish, 1999); number of regions (Kim, Hoskisson, & Wan, 2004); 
dispersion across countries (Goerzen & Beamish, 2003); and dispersion across regions 
(Hitt et al., 1997). Together, these variables capture the span of a firm’s foreign 
operations (Thomas & Eden, 2004). (3) Foreign subsidiaries (e.g., Vermeulen & 
Barkema, 2002), measured as the number of the firm’s foreign affiliates in a given year, 
and the ratio of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries (Gomez-Mejia & Palich, 1997). 
(4) Internationalization dummy (Chakrabarti, Vidal, & Mitchell, 2011), which takes value 
of 1 if the firm has an international presence and 0 otherwise. (5) Composite measure 
(Sanders & Carpenter, 1998), which measures the internationalization of a firm in a given 
year by integrating different internationalization measures into a composite indicator. 
Institutional Moderators 
Formal institutions. As proposed in our preceding review, we examine three sets 
of formal institutions. First, we assess the role of a country’s legal tradition on the I-P 
relationship in terms of civil law vs. common law. Specifically, we use a time invariant 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the country relies on the English common law system 
and 0 otherwise (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997). These data are extracted from the database 
compiled by the University of Ottawa’s JuriGlobe. Second, to capture economic 
regulatory institutions, we consider the quality of government regulations targeting 
starting, operating and closing a business. Specifically, we use the home country’s degree 
of business freedom, which measures the quality of the regulations of business behavior 
such as licensing and registration requirements. This measure comes from the Index of 
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Economic Freedom, which is computed by the Heritage Foundation on a yearly basis 
(Heritage Foundation, 2015) and has also been used widely in the international 
management research (e.g., Meyer & Sinani, 2009; Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, & 
Chittoor, 2010). This variable is time variant. Third, we explore the role of political 
institutions by examining the degree to which a country’s political structure creates 
political risks for firms and investors. Specifically, we use Witold Henisz’s Political 
Constraint Index dataset (POLCON V), which measures political risk in terms of the 
degree of restrictions on policy changes and the distribution of power across political 
branches (Henisz, 2000). The index ranges between 0 (most hazardous) and 1 (most 
constrained, i.e., stable) and has been extensively used in IB research (e.g., Guler & 
Guillén, 2010; Lu, 2002). This index is time variant. Also, we reverse code the index, so 
that higher levels indicate more politically risky home countries. 
Informal institutions. As discussed in our review, we examine the role of three 
informal institutions. First, we examine the moderating role of generalized trust, which 
reflects the degree to which a country’s citizens trust members of other nations. Data for 
this time variant variable were obtained from the World Value Survey, which has been 
used extensively in international research on generalized trust (e.g., Ertug et al., 2013; 
Ferrin & Gillespie, 2010). Second, we examine the home country’s future orientation, 
which is “the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies engage in such 
behavior as planning, investing in the future, and delaying individual or collective 
gratification” (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004: 12). This measure 
comes from the GLOBE project, which has been widely used by scholars exploring the 
management implications of national culture (e.g., Sarala & Vaara, 2010) and is time 
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invariant. Third, we assess home country’s uncertainty avoidance, which is “the extent to 
which members of an organization or society strive to avoid uncertainty by relying on 
established social norms, rituals, and bureaucratic practices” (House et al., 2004: 11). 
This time invariant measure is also drawn from the GLOBE project. 
Control Variables 
We also include numerous firm-, industry-, home and host country-level control variables 
in the MARA model. To control for definitional effects, we include separate dummy 
variables for the different definitions of internationalization and performance that we 
discussed above, using foreign subsidiaries and market-based measures as the two 
reference categories. We also include dummy variables measuring whether 
internationalization was lagged (1) or not (0) in the studies. 
To control for methodological artifacts, we test for the “file drawer problem” 
(Rosenthal, 1979) by including a dummy variable denoting whether a study was 
published or not (reference group). To allow for the possibility that the focal relationship 
might change over time, we control for the median year of sample window. We also 
include dummy variables indicating whether effect sizes were based on a panel or cross-
sectional (reference group) design, and whether they were derived from a study 
controlling for endogeneity of internationalization on firm performance or not (reference 
group). We control for type of firm, namely whether the sample includes only public 
firms, private firms or both (reference group). We also control for firm size, namely 
whether the sample includes only large firms, small medium size enterprises (SMEs) or 
both (reference group). We control for the four industries in which sector-specific results 
were available: chemical, consultancy, high tech, pharma/biotech and mixed (reference 
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group). We assess whether primary studies controlled for industry effects or not 
(reference group), year effects or not (reference group), and we include the number of 
variables included in the regression models. We also include a control denoting whether 
the sample included firms from multiple countries or not (reference group). Finally, we 
include home country total GDP to control for the size of the home country’s economy as 
it could influence the I-P relationship (Elango & Sethi, 2007). 
To account for the effects of specific omitted variables, we incorporate a set of 
dummy variables indicating whether the following variables were included (yes = 1) in 
the model from which a given effect size was derived: firm previous international 
experience, prior firm performance measure, firm size, firm age, R&D intensity, 
advertising intensity, product diversification, debt to equity level, firm risk, firm growth, 
capital intensity, CEO/Top Management Team (TMT) international experience, board 
independence, ownership concentration, inside ownership, foreign ownership, family 
ownership, business group affiliation, industry performance, host country potential (i.e., 
the opportunities associated with operations in the host country), and country distance 
(i.e., the institutional distance between the home and the host country). 
RESULTS 
I-P Relationship: Size, Shape and Related Methodological Issues 
HOMA results. We present in Table 1.1 the results for our r-based (left-hand 
panel) and rxy.z-based (right-hand panel) HOMA analyses. Like prior meta-analyses 
(Bausch & Kirst, 2007: r-based mean = 0.06; Kirca et al., 2011: r-based mean = 0.10; 
Ruigrok & Wagner, 2004: r-based mean = 0.04), we find that, overall, 
internationalization has a small but statistically significant positive effect on firm 
performance, albeit smaller when focusing on partial correlation (r-based mean = 0.06; 
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rxy.z-based mean = 0.02) and with the caveat that the variance contained in both effect size 
distributions is high (r-distribution: Q = 16,663.38, I2 = 0.97; rxy.z-distribution: Q = 
26,479.83, I2 = 0.95). Under these conditions, the mean is best interpreted as an average 
rather than a common true correlation value (Hedges & Olkin, 1985: 235), implying that 
the I-P relationship has a negative sign in several samples and also suggesting influence 
from moderators. Thus, further moderator analyses are needed. The funnel plot presented 
in Figure 1.2, which represents sample size against effect size, visually depicts the 
heterogeneity present in the effect size distribution. The spread of the retrieved effect 
sizes is considerable, and the distribution occupies broad zones left and right of the zero 
mark. 
Sub-group HOMA analyses reveal that the heterogeneity in study findings is at 
least partially driven by how firm performance is operationalized. Based on the r-based 
HOMA analysis, we find that, first, the measures of firm performance are positively but 
not highly correlated with one another (r-based mean = 0.33). Second, we find that, 
whereas the mean effect sizes based on accounting measures (r-based mean = 0.06; rxy.z -
based mean = 0.01 n.s.), market measures (r-based mean = 0.05; rxy.z -based mean = 0.03) 
and sales growth (r-based mean = 0.05; rxy.z -based mean = 0.04) are close to the overall 
mean effect size, those based on self-reported survey data are substantially higher (r-
based mean = 0.14; rxy.z -based mean = 0.09).  
Consistent with prior research (Sullivan, 1994), we find that the 
internationalization construct is multidimensional and that these dimensions are far from 
perfectly correlated with each other: the mean correlation between internationalization 
variables is 0.35 in the r-based HOMA analysis. This result points to the need to further 
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examine the role of this focal construct: only the measures of internationalization by 
depth (r-based mean = 0.06; rxy.z -based mean = 0.01) or breadth (r-based mean = 0.07; 
rxy.z -based mean = 0.06) are statistically significant with a positive sign in both analyses. 
This suggests that the differential operationalizations of the internationalization variable 
moderate the overall I-P relationship.   
In the rxy.z -based HOMA analyses, we also test for non-linear relationships 
between internationalization and firm performance. Neither the quadratic nor the cubic 
relationship is supported, as the quadratic and cubic terms are statistically insignificant.  
Finally, in only seven percent of all rxy.z, the Z-vector also contained an 
instrumental variable to address potential endogeneity issues. We find in the HOMA 
analyses that endogeneity is an important issue because the meta-analytic mean for 
studies using endogeneity corrections is considerably lower than that for studies not using 
such corrections. Importantly, the statistically significant overall effect of the I-P 
relationship disappears for studies using endogeneity corrections (-0.01 (n.s.) vs. 0.02).  
In the HOMA analyses, we also consider the heterogeneity of the 
internationalization process and its potential influence on firm performance. Specifically, 
we test whether speed and rhythm of the internationalization process affect firm 
performance (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). Our results show that the rhythm of the 
internationalization process does not affect firm performance (r-based mean = -0.05 n.s.; 
rxy.z -based mean = 0.01 n.s.). Speed of internationalization is not a consistently relevant 
moderator of the I-P relationship, as shown by a coefficient that is both positive and 
statistically insignificant in the r-based analyses (i.e., r-based mean = 0.01 n.s.) but 
negative and statistically significant in the rxy.z -based analyses (rxy.z -based mean = -0.04). 
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MARA results. These results further illustrate the importance of controlling for 
measurement, methodological, and model specification artifacts and are reported in Table 
1.2. In terms of measurement concerns, they show that the coefficient estimates of 
breadth of internationalization (β = 0.05, p < 0.01) and survey measures of performance 
(β = 0.08, p < 0.01) are the largest among the statistically significant estimates of the 
internationalization and firm performance definitions, respectively. These results are 
consistent with the HOMA results and also confirm previous findings (i.e., Kirca et al., 
2012b; Thomas & Eden, 2004) suggesting that breadth of internationalization has a 
stronger effect on firm performance than depth.  
The positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate for the published 
study variable (β = 0.02, p < 0.05) indicates that the “file drawer problem” is present in 
the I-P literature. Studies reporting greater effects have a better chance of being 
published. In addition, the positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate for the 
median year of the sampling window (β = 0.002, p < 0.01) suggests that studies using 
more recent samples find stronger I-P relationship effects. Our MARA results also show 
a negative and statistically significant moderating effect of the endogeneity control 
variable (β = -0.05, p < 0.01), confirming that studies using endogeneity corrections 
report weaker effects. In addition, we see a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient estimate for our large firm control variable (β = 0.02, p < 0.01), which 
suggests that the I-P relationship is stronger for large firms. In terms of industry controls, 
we find that, relative to the multiple industry samples, the banking, finance and insurance 
(β = -0.04, p < 0.01), consultancy (β = -0.05, p < 0.01), high tech (β = -0.08, p < 0.01), 
and pharma/biotech (β = -0.08, p < 0.01) industries are all characterized by a weaker 
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influence of internationalization on firm performance. However, this relationship is 
stronger for firms in the chemical industry (β = 0.10, p < 0.01). Finally, we find that the 
home country’s total GDP has a statistically significant (albeit moderate) effect on the 
focal relationship (β = -0.00, p < 0.10). 
Finally, the MARA results also indicate that omitted variable biases frequently 
affect I-P studies (see discussion of this issue in Kirca et al., 2011). In particular, failing 
to control for: i) prior firm performance, ii) firm size, iii) firm age, iv) firm risk, v) firm 
growth, vi) CEO/TMT international experience, vii) foreign ownership, and viii) 
institutional distance between the firm’s home and host countries may distort estimates of 
the focal relationship. Therefore, such variables should be included in the vector of 
control variables in future studies to prevent omitted variable biases. 
Country-level Variance of Effect Sizes   
The variance in the effect size distribution is partially detailed in Table 1.3 by dividing 
the overall sample into country-specific subsamples. A formal meta-analytic hierarchical 
linear model estimation (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002), in which effect sizes are nested in 
countries, shows that home country effects account for 12-22 percent of the variance in 
the effect size distribution. A casual inspection of these sub-sample results indicates that 
a significant amount of variance resides at the home country level of analysis. First, there 
are countries in which internationalization has statistically significant negative effects on 
firm performance in both analyses (Kenya and Finland). Second, there are 14 countries, 
developed and emerging alike, in which the focal relationship is statistically insignificant 
(Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, 
New Zeeland, Pakistan, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey and Uruguay). In a third set of countries 
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(in China, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Russia, Sweden and the U.S.), 
internationalization results in statistically significant performance advantages in either r-
based or rxy.z -based HOMA analyses. Finally, in seven countries (Brazil, Finland, 
Singapore, Slovenia, South Korea, Switzerland and the U.K.), the focal relationship is 
statistically significant in both analyses and ranges from small to strong positive values. 
In sum, these results indicate that the strength of the focal relationship varies across 
contexts, thus providing the impetus for an examination of the institutional home country 
moderator effects. 
Home Country Institutional Moderators of the I-P Relationship 
The results of the MARA procedure, which pertain to the moderating effects of home 
country formal and informal institutions, are presented in Table 1.2.3 The dependent 
variable for each model is the correlation between internationalization and firm 
performance. The results in Table 1.2 show that the coefficient estimate for the law 
tradition dummy is not statistically significant (β = -0.01, p > 0.10). Therefore, home 
country legal tradition does not moderate the relationship between internationalization 
and performance. Results in Table 1.2 show a statistically significant negative coefficient 
estimate for quality of business regulations (β = -0.001, p < 0.05). This suggests that the 
home country’s business regulations negatively moderate the focal relationship and, thus, 
internationalization has a less positive effect on firm performance when the quality of 
business regulations is higher. Finally, home country political risk positively moderates 
                                                            
3 Multicollinearity between country-level variables did not constitute a significant problem, as the highest 
correlation is point 0.71 (between generalized trust and common law tradition). Moreover, when one of the 
variables is left out of the model, the coefficient estimates remain basically unchanged, which also suggests 
that our results are not affected by multicollinearity issues. 
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the I-P relationship (β = 0.08, p < 0.01), implying that internationalization has a more 
positive effect on firm performance when political risk is higher.  
The results in Table 1.2 show that generalized trust positively moderates the focal 
relationship (β = 0.001, p < 0.01), suggesting that internationalization has a more positive 
effect on firm performance when home country’s levels of generalized trust are higher. 
Table 1.2 results also show that the focal relationship is positively moderated by home 
country future orientation, albeit at a marginal level of statistical significance (β = 0.04, p 
< 0.10). Higher home country future orientation is associated with a stronger influence of 
internationalization on firm performance. Finally, in Table 1.2, the coefficient estimate of 
uncertainty avoidance is negative and statistically significant (β = -0.03, p < 0.01), 
suggesting that internationalization has a less positive effect on firm performance when 
home country uncertainty avoidance is higher.  
Additional Robustness Tests 
We perform additional robustness tests to assess whether stochastic dependencies 
deriving from the harvesting of multiple effect sizes from a single study caused material 
problems in our data and findings. First, we run a separate HiLMMA analysis 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Van Essen et al., 2012a), in which we modeled effect sizes 
(level 1 observations) as nested in studies (level 2 observations). The corrected mean 
correlations (r-based mean = 0.04; rxy.z-based mean = 0.03), which in HiLMMA are 
denoted as the level 1 intercept γ0 (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002), are similar to the 
uncorrected mean correlations between I-P (see Table 1.1). This diagnostic test thus 
shows that stochastic interdependencies between effect sizes deriving from similar 
studies do not influence our results. Second, we conduct a separate HOMA test in which 
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all studies are represented by a single value by combining all individual measurements of 
the focal effect into a linear composite (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990: 457-460). The results 
show an r-based mean correlation of 0.06 and an rxy.z-based mean correlation of 0.02, 
suggesting that the incorporation of multiple measurements of the focal effect in the 
HOMA analyses does not affect our results. Finally, we test for the effect of outliers in 
both HOMA and MARA models (Buckley et al., 2013) and confirm that the results are 
not affected by observations with extreme values. 
DISCUSSION 
Research on the I-P relationship is extensive, and yet its findings, including those about 
the sign and shape of the relationship, have been inconclusive. To reconcile these 
inconsistencies, scholars have conducted a number of meta-analyses (e.g., Bausch & 
Krist, 2007; Kirca et al., 2011; Kirca et al., 2012b; Ruigrok & Wagner, 2004; Yang & 
Driffield, 2012), which have also yielded inconclusive findings. Our review suggests that 
a primary reason for this lack of consistent results is that scholars have overlooked the 
moderating influence of firms’ home country institutional contexts on the I-P 
relationship, even though many have argued that home country institutions have a strong 
influence on how well firms are able to benefit from their internationalization efforts 
(Bausch & Krist, 2007; Hitt et al., 2006b; Kirca et al., 2012b; Matysiak & Bausch, 2012; 
Ruigrok, Amann, & Wagner 2007; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). This study addresses this 
research gap, and finds that the nature of the I-P relationship does indeed depend on 
different formal and informal home country institutions. Specifically, five out of the six 
examined home country institutional variables moderate the I-P relationship. Hence, the 
lack of attention to the importance of home country conditions is a key problem of the 
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extant research on the I-P relationship. In addition, these results contribute to both the 
institution-based view of strategy and research on the performance benefits of 
internationalization by providing evidence that the inputs, norms, standards and rules of 
firms’ home countries enable them to acquire, develop and deploy resources that help 
them achieve (or prevent them from achieving) competitive advantages over firms from 
other countries. Below we illustrate our main contributions and their relevance for future 
research on the I-P relationship.  
Linking Research on the I-P Relationship and the Institution Based View in 
Strategy 
Our first contribution to the global strategy literature is the demonstration of the need for 
the integration of arguments from the research on the I-P relationship and the institution-
based view of strategy to illustrate the moderating effects of home country formal and 
informal institutions on this relationship. In particular, our results show that, except for 
civil law institutions, all of the examined formal and informal institutions moderate the I-
P relationship. First, quality of business regulations negatively moderates the I-P 
relationship, in contrast with some prior research that suggested it might have a positive 
moderating effect. Our results are in line with Batjargal and colleagues’ (2013) findings 
that strong regulations often are inefficient (too bureaucratic) and thus have a negative 
influence on internationalization and other types of economic activity (see also: Arregle, 
Miller, Hitt, & Beamish, 2013). Further, we contend that weak business regulations in the 
home country may help firms to develop coping skills that they can then leverage in their 
foreign operations (Luo & Tung, 2007: 486) and require less managerial time and effort 
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for bureaucratic red tape. Thus, weaker home country regulatory environments allow 
managers more flexibility in using their resources to explore international markets.  
Second, we find that firms from less politically risky home countries receive 
fewer performance benefits from internationalization. Favorable political environments 
provide firms with better growth opportunities in their home country, and fewer 
opportunities in foreign markets to achieve greater returns. In contrast, firms from 
countries with higher levels of political risk can benefit more from their 
internationalization as they can access opportunities and resources that are not available 
in their home markets, increasing their probability of improving their performance. 
Finally, political risk may drive firms to develop capabilities for managing difficult or 
unsupportive political institutions in their home country, which strengthen their ability to 
manage the internal and external complexity in their host countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2011).  
Third, regarding informal institutions, our results show that firms from home 
countries with higher generalized trust (i.e., where citizens are more trusting of people 
from other countries), longer-term orientation, and lower uncertainty avoidance are likely 
to reap greater returns from internationalization. We believe that embeddedness in a 
home country with the aforementioned institutional characteristics helps firms to better 
deal with the inherent challenges involved in internationalization. Internationalization is a 
long-term strategy that entails risk because it requires firms to develop new capabilities, 
overcome liabilities of foreignness, and manage complex and sometimes distant 
international activities (e.g., Hitt, Li, & Xu, 2015; Lu & Beamish, 2004; Vahlne & 
Ivarsson, 2014). As a result, higher generalized trust, long-term orientation and 
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uncertainty acceptance can help benefit from internationalization by enabling the 
development of coping skills, other capabilities, and a general learning orientation. Trust 
is often critical for building effective relationships with foreign stakeholders (e.g., 
suppliers, customers, government units) and engaging new environments. A long-term 
orientation helps firms look beyond the temporary effects of initial costs on long-term 
performance, and commit to opportunities that have longer-term payoffs. Finally, 
entering new international markets is often inherently uncertain, such that trying to avoid 
uncertainty causes managers to overlook markets with the greatest economic 
opportunities. On the other hand, firms that are comfortable with uncertainty are more 
likely to identify and exploit more risky but highly beneficial market opportunities.  
These results have interesting and important implications for future research on 
the I-P relationship. First, we have illustrated the importance of several home country 
formal and informal institutions as moderators of the I-P relationship, but additional 
facets of the home country institutional context should be examined in future research. 
Second, our work could be further advanced through primary research aimed at 
understanding whether managers’ perceptions of home country institutional factors shape 
their decisions about global expansion and their firms’ ability to profit from it. Such an 
investigation could shed light on whether managers’ enactment of their home country 
institutional environment is a salient feature of its moderating effect on the I-P 
relationship. Third, given the significant effects of numerous firm-, industry-, and host 
country-level factors, additional interactive, within- and cross-level relationships could be 
explored. For example, future research could examine how the home country institutional 
environment moderates the I-P relationship depending on firms’ engagement in upstream 
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or downstream internationalization strategies. The same relationship could be examined 
based on firms’ motivations for internationalization (e.g., market expansion vs. access to 
valuable/needed resources) (Luo & Tung, 2007).  
Exploring the Polycentric Nature of the Home Country Institutional Environment 
Our second contribution pertains to the integration of both formal and informal 
institutions into the analysis of the moderating effects of institutional embeddedness on 
the I-P relationship. The limited amount of existing research that has accounted for home 
country institutional context has largely focused on individual attributes of formal 
institutions (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011), even though institutional environments contain 
multiple formal and informal institutions that can affect MNE performance. By 
examining multiple formal and informal institutions across many countries over a long 
period of time, our study suggests that the polycentric and complex nature of the 
institutional environments in which MNEs operate needs to be examined more closely 
(Batjargal et al., 2013; Marano & Kostova, 2016). In particular, our results support 
Ostrom’s (2005) assertion that institutional polycentrism, or institutions arising from 
multiple centers of power, can generate concurrent effects on firms, implying that 
managers should consider such polycentricism when making strategic decisions (e.g., 
entering new international markets) (Batjargal et al., 2013). For this reason, our study 
extends research on institutional complexity and suggests that future research on 
international strategy should also consider such complexity. We believe that 
configurations of both formal and informal institutions should be examined to accurately 
understand the institutional effects that shape the I-P relationship. While we have already 
shown that several sets of home country institutions help explain the strength of the I-P 
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relationship, some of these institutions may also interact (Holmes et al., 2013) to form 
configurations that managers should consider. A logical next step would be to identify 
specific configurations of home country institutions and determine if they have unique 
effects on this relationship. Although several approaches could be used for such research, 
fuzzy-set analysis might be especially suited for this type of study (e.g., Fiss, 2011; 
Pajunen, 2008).  
Our results also suggest that future empirical studies on the I-P relationship should 
consider firms from a variety of home countries to increase the accuracy and 
generalizability of their results. Because the home country institutional context matters, it 
is important to move beyond models that simply control for home country and instead 
include related variables in the theoretical framework and methodological design. As a 
result, we believe that multilevel modeling and theorizing, which we also implemented in 
some of our meta-analytic tests, should be used more frequently in research on this topic 
as it tests theories that include effects at multiple levels of analysis (Hitt, Beamish, 
Jackson, & Mathieu, 2007; Peterson, Arregle, & Martin, 2012). One of the main 
advantages of multilevel theorizing and modeling is that they enable researchers to 
account for the partial effects of individuals’ and firms’ inclusions in higher-level 
collectivities and possible interactive effects between levels (Rousseau, 1985). Building 
on our findings, future research could use a multilevel approach to further investigate 
other home and/or host country- and even region-level nesting effects on the I-P 
relationship. However, one of the challenges associated with multilevel modeling 
statistical techniques such as hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) and random coefficient 
modeling (RCM) is accessing appropriate data, because the examination of such 
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multilevel effects requires larger cross-country samples (see Peterson et al., 2012 for a 
discussion of this issue). We also believe that case studies and other types of qualitative 
research could be fruitfully used to investigate less explored factors at different levels of 
analysis that may shape firms’ ability to benefit from their internationalization efforts, 
including (as we further illustrate below) the role of managerial cognition and various 
process outcomes associated with internationalization. 
Finally, scholars could build on our results by investigating the mutual influences 
between MNEs and their institutional environments. While we emphasized firms’ 
reactions to institutional forces, it is also important to examine the extent to which these 
organizations can affect the home country contexts where they operate, perhaps by 
studying the co-evolution of MNEs and their institutional environments (Saka-Helmhout 
& Geppert, 2011). Such an approach would require shifting from a conceptualization of 
institutions as variables, and instead embracing “an approach that is historical, contextual 
and multidisciplinary in nature” (Cantwell et al., 2010: 580-581).  
Exploring the Role of Methodological Heterogeneity in the I-P research   
Our third contribution is methodological and relates to our meta-analytical tests’ reliance 
on both Pearson product-moment correlation and partial correlation as effect sizes – a 
significant improvement from existing meta-analyses on this topic. The Pearson product-
moment correlation is the most commonly reported effect size statistic in management 
(Geyskens et al., 2009) and has been used in most previous meta-analyses on the I-P 
relationship. However, as we illustrated in the methods section, an exclusive reliance on 
Pearson product-moment correlation precludes existing meta-analyses from generating 
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conclusive findings on the sign and shape of the I-P relationship (Stanley & 
Doucouliagos, 2012).  
Our results indicate that internationalization has an overall positive effect on 
performance that is robust across samples of 1,558,455 firms for the bivariate analyses 
and 2,576,772 firms for the partial analyses from 32 countries between 1972 and 2012. 
However, this effect is small (r-based mean = 0.06; rxy.z-based mean = 0.02, p < 0.05) and 
varies significantly by country. This finding suggests that scholars interested in the I-P 
relationship should accept a modest positive association between internationalization and 
performance as a stylized fact (Helfat, 2007), while also understanding that the true 
nature of the relationship is substantially contingent on home country factors. This also 
implies that there is less need for further empirical evidence on the I-P relationship, 
except perhaps for examining the influences of specific national contexts. This result is 
also consistent with previous meta-analytic findings (e.g., Bausch & Kirst, 2007; Kirca et 
al., 2011). But, in contrast to previous meta-analyses by Kirca et al. (2012b) and Yang 
and Driffield (2012) that validated a U-shaped relationship, we do not find support for a 
non-linear I-P relationship. However, the appropriate meta-analytic approach to test for 
non-linear relationships involves using partial correlations as effect sizes as we have done 
in this study (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2012). We further illustrate the differences 
between our meta-analytic approach and findings and those of prior meta-analyses on the 
I-P relationship in Table 1.4. 
In all, our results suggest that the benefits of internationalization when examined 
in the aggregate, including economies of scale and scope, location-based advantages, 
international arbitrage, broader learning and market opportunities (Cardinal et al., 2011; 
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Hitt et al., 2006b) barely exceed its costs. They also emphasize the importance of further 
examining the sources of heterogeneity in firms’ ability to benefit from 
internationalization. In this study we focused our attention on an important (and, to date, 
scarcely explored) source of such variance, namely country of origin effects. Thus, there 
is need for additional research in this area. For example, while the COE tradition points 
to the importance of institutionally-derived cognitive imprinting for firms’ global 
strategy, scant attention has been paid thus far to the role of managerial cognition in 
shaping the internationalization choices that companies make (Maitland & Sammartino, 
2015; Zahra, Korri, & Yu, 2005). Modeling the role of managerial cognition could shed 
light on how managers “perceive and construct their industries’ boundaries and 
opportunities at home and in host countries” (Zahra et al., 2005: 130). Applying 
qualitative methods as used in the study by Maitland and Sammartino (2015) could be 
useful for such a study. Relatedly, our review also shows that we still know relatively 
little about the type of process outcomes that are generated by firms’ internationalization 
efforts, including operational improvements (Chang, 1995) and organizational learning 
(Zahra et al., 2000), which can also contribute to performance outcomes (Hitt et al., 
2006b), thus requiring more research.  
Relatedly, our review of the literature on the I-P relationship also revealed that the 
process of internationalization continues to receive limited attention; research focuses 
more on the drivers of speed and rhythm of internationalization and less on their 
performance-related consequences. While our meta-analytical results indicate that speed 
and rhythm of internationalization are not consistently important for firm performance, 
the limited number of studies exploring the performance implications of the 
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internationalization process suggests that more research is needed to achieve definitive 
conclusions. Such research would strengthen our understanding of the internal and 
external contexts in which internationalization decisions are made and their influences on 
why those decisions are made and how they are implemented. 
In our meta-analytical tests we examine other methodological drivers of the 
heterogeneity in the effect size distribution for the I-P relationship and find that the 
operationalization of both variables contributes significantly to such variance. 
Specifically, survey-based measures of performance show the largest effects, while mean 
effect sizes based on accounting and market measures are more closely clustered around 
the overall mean effect size. This is consistent with the notion that, as illustrated by 
previous studies (e.g., Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), survey-derived 
measures of performance can be inflated. In addition, we find that breadth of 
internationalization has stronger positive effects on performance than depth of 
internationalization, number of foreign subsidiaries, the ratio of foreign subsidiaries to 
total subsidiaries, and the internationalization dummy, which captures whether the firm 
has an international presence. This suggests that the heterogeneity of institutional 
contexts across which the firm operates (as implied by our measures of breadth of 
internationalization) creates learning opportunities for new knowledge that the firm can 
internalize to improve its performance (Zahra et al., 2000). These results are consistent 
with the view that exposure to diverse environments promotes system openness and 
learning of both universal and tacit knowledge (Zahra et al., 2000). They also suggest that 
future empirical tests should consider more carefully whether the chosen measures of 
internationalization and performance are consistent with their underlying theoretical 
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model (for a discussion of these issues see also: Hennart, 2011; Hitt et al., 2006b; 
Oesterle & Richta, 2013; Thomas & Eden, 2004). Additionally, our results show that the 
occurrence of omitted variable biases in I-P studies is common and that failing to control 
for any or all of the eight variables included in Table 1.2 may lead to distorted estimates 
of the focal relationship. Thus, future research should include these variables as controls 
to prevent omitted variable biases. 
Furthermore, our findings illustrate the importance of examining time-related 
effects by showing that studies with more recent samples display a stronger I-P 
relationship. Temporal effects have received limited attention in international strategy 
research, but are clearly important for understanding the magnitude of outcomes of firm 
strategies (e.g., Hough, 2006). We thus recommend that future research use multilevel 
growth modeling to analyze the I-P relationship and capture systematic patterns of 
change in it over time (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Multilevel growth modeling also has 
the advantage of avoiding the simplifying assumption that all firms have the same form 
of change over time, which is typical for most classical regression-based analyses. It can 
also mitigate biases inherent in other panel data methods, such as increased likelihood of 
making a Type I error, stronger correlations between observations that are temporally 
close to each other than observations that are temporally far apart (Bliese & Ployhart, 
2002), and heterogeneity in the residuals that can also affect the statistical tests by 
making them more liberal (Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010). Furthermore, it facilitates 
examining how the baseline level and the trend of firm’s performance over time are 
influenced by factors at different levels of analysis (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002). 
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TABLE 1.1: HOMA Meta-Analytic Results 
Mean = mean effect sizes marked with an asterisks (*) are statistically significant (p <0.05). k = number of effect sizes; N = total sample size; SE = the standard 
error of mean correlation; Q = Cochran’s homogeneity test statistic; I2 = scale-free index of heterogeneity. 
 Pearson product-moment correlation (r) Partial correlation coefficient (rxy.z) 
Predictor k N Mean SE Q test I2 k N Mean SE Q test I2
Internationalization to performance 640 1,558,455 0.06* 0.00 16,663.38 0.97 1,190 2,576,772 0.02* 0.00 26,479.83 0.95
Endogeneity control  84 478,157 -0.01 0.01 1,170.13 0.93
Quadratic relation   
Linear term  183 641,649 0.03* 0.01 1,970.21 0.91
Quadratic term  183 641,649 -0.00 0.00 1,308.62 0.86
Cubic relation   
Linear term  75 905,934 -0.02* 0.01 615.38 0.88
Quadratic term  75 905,934 0.01 0.01 637.14 0.88
Cubic term  75 905,934 -0.01 0.00 397.08 0.81
   
Measures of Firm performance    
Accounting measures 413 1,003,484 0.06* 0.01 12,189.44 0.97 643 1,424,417 0.01 0.00 6,149.83 0.90
Market measures 117 474,180 0.05* 0.01 2,998.88 0.96 438 1,019,743 0.03* 0.01 19,551.97 0.98
Sales growth 62 61,437 0.05* 0.01 557.59 0.89 53 110,333 0.04* 0.01 278.02 0.81
Survey-based measures 48 19,354 0.14* 0.03 450.15 0.90 56 22,279 0.09* 0.02 267.95 0.79
   
Measures of Internationalization    
Depth of internationalization 259 743,494 0.06* 0.01 7166.56 0.96 545 906,640 0.01* 0.00 8203.71 0.93
Breadth (scope) of internationalization 170 281,546 0.07* 0.01 5284.87 0.97 298 462,436 0.06* 0.00 2359.66 0.87
Foreign subsidiaries 33 47,048 -0.01 0.01 227.28 0.86 63 68,921 -0.00 0.01 233.55 0.74
Internationalization dummy 54 295,269 0.12* 0.01 1,928.42 0.97 97 530,677 -0.02 0.02 12,660.20 0.99
Composite measure 65 114,256 0.07* 0.01 898.16 0.93 96 65,635 0.00 0.01 876.96 0.89
   
Firm performance to firm performance 262 372,861 0.33* 0.02 32,345.31 0.99  
Internationalization to internationalization 242 221,079 0.35* 0.02 25,937.70 0.99  
   
Rhythm to firm performance 5 7,487 -0.05 0.05 30.43 0.87 7 9,908 0.01 0.01 2.21 0.00
Speed to firm performance 12 3,450 0.01 0.04 48.72 0.77 28 11,969 -0.04* 0.01 30.56 0.12
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TABLE 1.2: MARA Meta-Analytic Results 
  
Variable Coefficient Estimates 
Internationalization definition
Depth of Internationalization 0.02 (0.01)*
Breadth (or Scope) of Internationalization 0.05 (0.01)***
Internationalization dummy -0.01 (0.01)
Composite measure 0.03 (0.01)**
Internationalization previous year -0.03 (0.01)***
 
Firm performance definition 
Accounting measures -0.01 (0.01)
Sales growth 0.00 (0.01)
Survey measures 0.08 (0.02)***
 
Methodological artifacts 
Published study 0.02 (0.01)**
Median year of sample window 0.002 (0.00)***
Panel design 0.00 (0.01)
Endogeneity check -0.05 (0.01)***
 
Type of firms 
 
Publicly listed firms -0.01 (0.00)
Private firms -0.03 (0.02)
 
Size of the firms 
 
Large firms 0.02 (0.01)***
SME firms 0.02 (0.02)
 
Industries 
 
Banking, finance & insurance sector -0.04 (0.01)***
Chemical 0.10 (0.03)***
Consultancy -0.11 (0.03)***
High tech -0.05 (0.02)***
Pharma & biotech -0.08 (0.02)***
 
Model specification artifacts 
Industry controls 0.01 (0.01)
Year controls -0.02 (0.01)*
Number of variables in regression -0.00 (0.00)
Multiple countries 0.00 (0.01)
 
Firm controls†  
Firm previous international experience -0.02 (0.02)
firm’s prior performance 0.02 (0.01)***
Firm size 0.03 (0.01)***
Firm age -0.03 (0.01)***
R&D intensity -0.01 (0.01)
Advertising intensity -0.01 (0.01)
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TABLE 1.2: MARA Meta-Analytic Results (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dependent variable is the I-P correlation in a given primary sample. Unstandardized regression 
coefficients are presented with standard errors in parentheses. k is the number of samples; Q is the 
homogeneity statistic with its probability in parentheses; v is the random effects variance component.  
† indicates if a variable is included in a model (yes = 1) to test “omitted variable” bias. 
*p < 0.10 
**p < 0.05 
***p < 0.01 
Product diversification 0.01 (0.01)
Debt to equity level -0.01 (0.02)
Firm risk -0.04 (0.01)***
Firm growth 0.04 (0.01)***
Capital intensity -0.01 (0.02)
 
Governance and TMT controls†  
CEO/TMT international experience -0.06 (0.03)*
Board independence 0.04 (0.03)
Ownership concentration -0.01 (0.02)
Inside ownership 0.03 (0.02)
Foreign ownership 0.06 (0.02)**
Family ownership 0.03 (0.02)
Business group affiliation 0.00 (0.02)
 
Industry and country controls
Industry performance† -0.01 (0.02) 
Host country potential† 0.02 (0.02) 
Country distance† -0.07 (0.03)*** 
Total GDP (home country) in billions -0.00 (0.00)*
 
Home country institutions
Generalized trust 0.001 (0.00)*** 
Future orientation 0.04 (0.02)*
Uncertainty avoidance -0.03 (0.01)***
Common law tradition -0.01 (0.02)
Government business regulation -0.001 (0.00)**
Political risk 0.08 (0.02)***
 
K 1830
Qmodel(p) 383.69 (0.00)
Qresidual(p) 2547.75 (0.00)
V 0.01
  
73 
TABLE 1.3: HOMA Country-Specific Meta-Analytic Results 
 Pearson product-moment correlation (r) Partial linear correlation coefficient (rxy.z) 
Country  K N Mean SE Q test I2  K N Mean SE Q test I2
Australia  6 1,583 0.04 0.05 15.50 0.68   
Brazil  2 424 0.14* 0.05 0.09 0.00  4 2,900 0.09* 0.02 1.50 0.00
Canada  1 167 0.09  44 11,169 0.01 0.02 147.16 0.71
Mainland China  21 395,257 0.01 0.02 145.28 0.86  40 418,253 0.05* 0.01 417.43 0.91
Finland  2 434 0.35* 0.11 4.72 0.79   
France  2 3,014 0.12 0.20 61.36 0.98  12 7,856 0.09* 0.03 67.84 0.84
Germany  12 15,250 0.08* 0.03 104.99 0.90  40 49,764 -0.02 0.03 1807.76 0.98
Greece  1 763 0.06  3 2,289 0.21* 0.07 22.14 0.91
Hong Kong  2 162 -0.03 0.13 2.44 0.59   
Hungary  1 135 -0.02   
India  36 121,983 0.06* 0.01 854.42 0.96  61 158,910 0.00 0.01 319.76 0.81
Indonesia  2 319 -0.03 0.12 1.73 0.42  3 873 -0.00 0.05 3.67 0.46
Italy  7 3,549 0.01 0.05 52.06 0.88  26 27,204 0.05* 0.01 20.37 0.00
Japan  53 200,140 0.01 0.02 3110.32 0.98  57 71,163 -0.02 0.04 6977.19 0.99
Kenya    2 108 -0.29* 0.12 1.42 0.30
Malaysia  6 6,117 0.03 0.04 28.89 0.83  9 8,084 -0.07 0.04 82.93 0.90
Mexico  1 850 0.01  7 4,722 -0.04* 0.02 7.00 0.14
Netherlands  3 2,182 -0.07 0.09 34.40 0.94  12 10,525 0.01 0.02 65.14 0.83
New Zealand  2 410 -0.04 0.05 0.60 0.00  5 866 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.00
Pakistan    1 826 0.02
Russia    13 42,835 0.02* 0.00 6.24 0.00
Singapore  8 3,620 0.14* 0.04 26.24 0.73  4 1,993 0.10* 0.04 9.61 0.69
Slovenia  5 1,675 0.15* 0.04 9.66 0.59  5 1,675 0.07* 0.02 1.69 0.00
South Korea  39 61,996 0.03* 0.01 405.05 0.91  40 88,030 0.01* 0.01 96.24 0.59
Spain  9 10,583 0.08 0.06 83.16 0.90  1 374 0.03
Sweden  5 810 0.09 0.06 12.43 0.68  10 2,676 0.09* 0.02 6.23 0.00
Switzerland  5 2,876 0.06* 0.03 6.07 0.34  1 696 0.11
Taiwan  37 42,540 0.01 0.03 875.76 0.96  35 37,737 0.00 0.02 300.51 0.89
Turkey    16 3,200 0.01 0.02 7.64 0.00
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TABLE 1.3: HOMA Country-Specific Meta-Analytic Results (continued) 
UK  17 25,899 0.11* 0.04 611.84 0.97  42 38,006 0.06* 0.01 140.19 0.71
Uruguay    1 291 0.18
US  209 466,263 0.09* 0.01 3338.00 0.94  322 922,784 0.01 0.01 9779.86 0.97
Multiple  146 189,454 0.07* 0.01 3809.05 0.96  374 660,963 0.03* 0.00 3922.67 0.90
 
Mean = mean effect sizes marked with an asterisk (*) are statistically significant (p <0.05). k = number of effect sizes; N = total sample size; SE = the 
standard error of mean correlation; Q = Cochran’s homogeneity test statistic; I2 = scale-free index of heterogeneity. 
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TABLE 1.4: Meta-Analyses on the I-P Relationship 
 Our meta-analysis Bausch & Krist 
(2007)
Kirca et al. (2011) Kirca et al. 
(2012a)
Ruigrok & Wagner 
(2004)
Yang & Driffield 
(2012)
No. of primary studies 359 36 111 141 62 54
Data sources Pearson’s r and 
partial correlation 
rxy.z
Pearson’s r Pearson’s r Pearson’s r Pearson’s r β coefficients 
No. of effect sizes 640 (r) and 1,190 
(rxy.z)
146 346 416 174 370 
Time window 1972-2012 1979-2004 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1962-2004
No. of industries 5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
No. of countries 32 n.a. 17 n.a. 12 21
I-P relationship r-based mean: 0.06 
(sig.) 
rxy-based mean: 
0.02 (sig.) 
Non-linear 
relationship: n.s. 
r-based mean: 
0.059 (sig.) 
r-based mean: 0.10 
(sig.) 
 
Does not test the 
direct I-P 
relationship, but 
the moderation 
effect of different 
operationalizations 
of I on P (i.e., 
dummy variable 
for depth (vs. 
breadth) of I: - 
(sig.)) 
r-based mean: 0.04 
(sig.) 
Non-linear 
relationship: n.s. 
Does not test the 
direct I-P 
relationship, but 
moderation effect 
of  different 
operationalizations 
of I on P (i.e., 
dummy variable 
for non-FSTS 
measures of I: - 
(both sig. and 
n.s.))
Institutional moderators 
of the I-P relationship 
Country of origin 
effect 
(32 countries): sig. 
(see Table 1.3) 
Formal 
institutions: 
Common law: n.s.; 
Government 
business 
regulations: - 
(sig.); 
Country of origin: 
USA + (sig.); 
Europe + (sig.); 
and Japan (n.s.) 
Dummy variables 
for: Firms from 
developing 
economies with 
high advertising 
intensity (n.s.); 
Developing 
economies with 
high R&D 
intensity: + (sig.); 
Advanced 
Dummy variable 
for advanced 
economies: + (sig.)
Country of origin: 
USA + (sig.); 
Europe + (sig.); 
and Japan (n.s.) 
 
 
Dummy variable 
for non-US firms: 
+ (sig.) 
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Political risk: + 
(sig.) 
Informal 
institutions: 
Generalized trust: 
+ (sig.); 
Future orientation: 
+ (sig.);  
Uncertainty 
avoidance: - (sig.)
economy firms 
with high 
advertising 
intensity: + (sig.); 
Advanced 
economies with 
high R&D 
intensity: + (sig.) 
Moderation effect of 
industries on the I-P 
relationship 
Yes (banking, 
finance and 
insurance; 
chemical; 
consultancy; high 
tech; pharma and 
biotech)
Not Tested Yes 
(manufacturing vs. 
service, high tech 
vs. low tech) 
Yes 
(manufacturing vs. 
service) 
Not Tested Not Tested 
Moderation effect of 
different 
operationalizations of IV 
(I) and DV (P) 
Yes Yes Not Tested Yes Yes Yes 
TABLE 1.4: Meta-Analyses on the I-P Relationship (continued)
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FIGURE 1.1: Distribution of Papers over Time 
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FIGURE 1.2: Funnel Plot 
 
 
 
 
‐1 ‐0.8 ‐0.6 ‐0.4 ‐0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Sample Size
Effect Size
 79 
 
ESSAY 2
 
INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION: A META-ANALYSIS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Business landscapes are increasingly global. Over the last quarter of a century, world FDI 
outward stock has dramatically increased (from 2,254 billion of dollars in 1990 to 25,875 
in 2014) and country investment policy measures around the world have been geared to 
promote cross-border investment to an ever-larger extent (UNCTAD, 2015). In this 
scenario, constantly advancing our understanding of the implications of firms’ 
international diversification is a paramount objective for both scholars and practitioners. 
Equally important is the investigation of the factors potentially affecting cross-border 
investment decisions, given the complex competitive and economic cost-benefit trade-off 
characterizing international diversification. Indeed, the determinants and consequences of 
firms’ international diversification have drawn significant attention in the strategy and 
international business literatures (see Hitt et al., 2006 for a comprehensive review). 
Research has investigated antecedents at the individual, group, firm, industry, and 
country level of analysis (see Kirca et al., 2012 for a meta-analysis of those antecedents), 
as well as outcomes at the firm (e.g., Reeb et al., 1998; Zahra et al. 2000) and country 
level of analysis (e.g., Alfaro et al. 2006; Kwok & Tadesse, 2006; Spencer, 2008). In this 
 80 
 
paper, we focus on the complex, bidirectional relationship between corporate governance 
and firms’ international diversification. 
Anecdotal evidence in international business suggests that corporate governance 
may affect the extent of international diversification. For example, since the 1990s, 
Volkswagen Group has pursued an aggressive foreign expansion, consistent with the 
publicly-announced goal of being the world’s largest automaker by sales (The New York 
Times, 2015). However, as an analyst put it, “VW was an organization full of hubris, […] 
dominate the world and walk-on-water type of thinking” (Financial Times, 2016), 
suggesting that the aggressive international growth, whose side effects included the high-
profile violation of US environmental regulations, may not have necessarily been in the 
interest of minority shareholders and the society at large. Volkswagen’s corporate 
governance framework may have played an important role in the Group’s 
internationalization process. First, growth was a key criterion to which executive 
compensation was linked, resulting in a strong economic incentive to increase the size of 
the Group’s foreign footprint (Armour, 2016). Second, as pointed out by several experts, 
corporate governance practices at Volkswagen had “long been uniquely awful” (CNBC, 
2015). In particular, the lack of independence in the supervisory board (Financial Times, 
2015) exacerbated the effect of the incentives created by the executive compensation 
structure. Since growth was “an ambition that pleased both stakeholder groups 
dominating the Aufsichtsrat, the controlling shareholders and the employees” (Armour, 
2016), the board closely monitored growth performance (The New York Times, 2015).  
When focusing on corporate governance and the degree of international 
diversification, there is however the other side of the story. For example, after criticism 
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by U.S. institutional investors about its corporate governance framework, Samsung 
Group recently announced its plan to split the roles of CEO and chairman of the board at 
eight of its companies (e.g., Wall Street Journal, 2016). This move represents a step 
further in “bringing the company into alignment with global practices” (Wall Street 
Journal, 2016). 
From a theoretical point of view, corporate governance scholars suggest that 
governance mechanisms may affect the extent of firms’ international diversification (e.g., 
Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). By contrast, the international management literature 
suggests that expansion abroad, through multiple theoretical mechanisms, may trigger 
changes in firms’ corporate governance framework (e.g., Kostova et al., 2008; Sanders & 
Carpenter, 1998). The literature, indeed, provides evidence for both causality directions. 
For example, research corroborates the argument that firms’ degree of international 
diversification both affects (e.g., Le et al., 2013) and is affected (e.g., Tihanyi et al., 
2009) by the level of contingent executive pay. Similarly, some scholars show that the 
extent of foreign expansion has an effect on the proportion of outside directors (e.g., 
Tihanyi et al., 2003), while others provide evidence that board independence impacts 
export propensity (e.g., Lu et al., 2009). Likewise, the literature, on the one hand, shows 
that board size influences the firm’s degree of international diversification (e.g., Lien et 
al., 2005) and, on the other hand, provides empirical support for the opposite causality 
direction―from firms’ degree of foreign expansion to board size (e.g., Sanders & 
Carpenter, 1998). Besides the direction of causality, the sign of the relationship between 
corporate governance and firms’ international diversification also receives mixed 
empirical evidence. Some scholars report a positive correlation between the level of 
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ownership concentration and the extent of international diversification (e.g., Alessandri & 
Seth, 2014), while others provide evidence for a negative correlation (e.g., Hautz et al., 
2013). Similarly, research shows both a positive (e.g., Zahra, 2003) and a negative (e.g., 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010) correlation between CEO duality and the degree of foreign 
expansion. 
Extant research therefore, from both a theoretical and empirical perspective, does 
not provide definitive answer as to the nature (i.e., direction, magnitude, and sign) of the 
corporate governance-international diversification (CG-ID) relationship. Moreover, 
extant research is somewhat lacking in the exploration of the theoretical mechanisms 
linking corporate governance and international diversification (e.g., Filatotchev & 
Wright, 2011). In order to have more impactful research on the CG-ID relationship, it is 
critical to develop a more fine-grained understanding of which mechanisms are at play 
and how they operate. Hence, there is an opportunity for further research, which may 
advance our comprehension of such business phenomena as those mentioned above, and 
push forward the existing theoretical knowledge about the CG-ID relationship. Drawing 
on the corporate governance and international diversification literatures, we attempt to 
shed new light on such relationship in two major ways. First, we investigate each 
direction of causality and the theoretical mechanisms at play. Second, we examine the 
relative explanatory power of the two alternative cause-effect linkages between corporate 
governance and international diversification. Given the characteristics of our data and 
method, we believe that our twofold attempt represents also a constructive step in dealing 
with potential scientific apophenia (i.e., the tendency to find evidence of order where 
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none exists) in the CG-ID research area (e.g., Goldfarb & King, 2016; Harrison et al., 
2014). 
Agency theory and the resource perspective are the two primary theoretical lenses 
of this study. These perspectives are theoretically relevant when exploring the causal 
linkages between corporate governance and international diversification. Corporate 
governance is strictly related to the intensity of the agency problem (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997): A key reason for adopting 
certain corporate governance practices is the attempt by firms’ decision makers to contain 
the detrimental consequences of agency conflicts between owners and managers. 
International diversification is subject to agency problems for at least three reasons. First, 
internationalization decisions may entail a cost–benefit trade-off for managers and 
owners in terms of organizational outcomes. This is due to the fact that different risk 
preferences may lead to different objectives pursued by those who own and those who 
control the firm (e.g., Filatotchev & Wright, 2001). Second, internationalization decisions 
are characterized by low frequency and long duration, which make even more 
pronounced the aforementioned trade-off (e.g., Michael & Pearce, 2004). Third, 
international diversification aggravates information asymmetries between managers and 
owners, since it increases the external and internal complexity confronting the firm (e.g., 
Roth & O’Donnell, 1996; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). External complexity refers to the 
heterogeneity of the task environments (e.g., Child 1972; Dess & Beard, 1984), as well as 
to the variety of institutional prescriptions faced by the firm (e.g., Greenwood et al., 
2011; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Internal complexity refers to the organizational 
implications, in terms of structure, mechanisms, and culture, of external complexity (e.g., 
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Ashby, 1956; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Thompson, 1967). By exacerbating the external and 
internal complexity that firms need to deal with, international diversification also 
increases the information-processing demands confronting them (e.g., Sanders & 
Carpenter, 1998). This implies, inter alia, that “information-processing demands […] and 
agency concerns […] are at least partially isomorphic throughout an organization” 
(Sanders & Carpenter, 1998: 161). Therefore, when developing some of our hypotheses, 
we complement the agency theory perspective with the information-processing 
perspective. 
The resource perspective is particularly relevant for exploring the CG-ID 
relationship for at least two reasons. First, corporate governance mechanisms may favor 
the acquisition of organizational and managerial resources and capabilities instrumental 
in firms’ internationalization process. Second, international diversification implies 
exposure to different institutional environments, both at the national level and the 
transnational meta-level (Kostova et al., 2008). As a result, the firm may develop 
awareness of alternative practices in multiple domains, including corporate governance, 
and learn how to implement and integrate those practices within the organizational 
framework (e.g., Marano et al., 2016). Based on these two perspectives, we predict that 
corporate governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem and those providing 
better access to organizational and managerial resources have a positive effect on the 
firm’s degree of international diversification. Moreover, we predict that the firm’s degree 
of international diversification positively influences the activation of corporate 
governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem and/or increasing the 
information-processing capacity of the firm. 
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International management research suggests that depth and breadth of 
international diversification represent two different (though not orthogonal) dimensions 
of firms’ foreign footprint (e.g., Hitt et al., 2006; Thomas & Eden, 2004), which are 
characterized by peculiar theoretical implications in terms, for example, of knowledge 
requirements, resource access and development, economies along the value chain, and 
risk mitigation. We suggest that distinguishing between the two dimensions may be 
particularly relevant in the context of the CG-ID relationship. First, the risk preferences 
of managers may entail different attitudes towards the larger extent of operations abroad 
associated with higher depth from the greater diversity resulting from higher breadth. 
Second, depth and breadth seem to have different implications in terms of complexity to 
cope with, which in turn affect the agency and resource issues confronted by the firm. 
Failing to unpack international diversification into depth and breadth may leave an 
important part of the story untold, as depth and breadth may affect and be affected 
differently by corporate governance. Therefore, we also explore whether and how the 
direction, magnitude, and sign of the CG-ID relationship changes when considering depth 
and breadth of international diversification. 
An additional step to advance our understanding of the CG-ID relationship is the 
examination of contingencies that may affect the relationship. Indeed, little is understood 
about potential moderators altering the causal connections between corporate governance 
and size of foreign footprint. In this study, we focus on two contingencies at the country 
level that may moderate the CG-ID relationship: the institutional characteristic of legal 
protection of minority shareholders and the cultural value of uncertainty avoidance. 
Research in international finance and international management shows that the legal 
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protection of shareholders varies across countries (e.g., Djankov et al., 2008; Guillen & 
Capron, 2016; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). When studying the CG-ID relationship, the 
legal protection of shareholders is relevant for at least two reasons. First, the relative 
impact of (soft) corporate governance mechanisms on international diversification 
decisions may change, depending on whether the country institutional context contributes 
to curtail or compound agency problems (e.g., Capron & Guillen, 2009). Second, firms 
from countries with lower shareholder protection may be particularly eager to adapt to 
transnational pressures for ‘good’ corporate governance when expanding abroad (e.g., 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). When exploring the CG-ID relationship, uncertainty avoidance 
may be another consequential contingency. Given the performance uncertainty associated 
with the strategic decision to expand into foreign countries, the influence of corporate 
governance on international diversification may vary across countries characterized by 
different levels of uncertainty avoidance. 
The research questions addressed in this study are, therefore, the following: 
1) What is the direction, magnitude, and sign of the causal relationship between 
corporate governance and international diversification? 
2) What are the theoretical mechanisms at play in the CG-ID relationship? 
3) Do direction, magnitude, and sign of the causal relationship change when 
distinguishing between depth and breadth of international diversification? 
4) Does the home-country institutional context affect the CG-ID relationship? 
Specifically, do the legal protection of minority shareholders and the national uncertainty 
avoidance moderate the causal effects between corporate governance and international 
diversification? 
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In order to address our research questions, we use meta-analytic structural 
equation modeling (MASEM) with data from 104 studies conducted in the management, 
economics, and finance disciplines over the last two decades. As Bergh and his 
colleagues (2016) point out, MASEM offers significant advantages for advancing 
existing research. First, MASEM allows us to build on the extant body of empirical 
research testing the CG-ID relationship in order to assess: 1) the direct effects model 
linking corporate governance to the degree of international diversification; and 2) the 
direct effects model linking the degree of international diversification to corporate 
governance. Unlike MASEM, traditional meta-analysis cannot be used to test competing 
models against one another; it can only be employed to test the sign and significance of 
the bivariate relationships of interest. MASEM represents a more powerful technique 
than traditional meta-analysis, providing the opportunity to draw on the accumulated 
findings to pit alternative complex models (Bergh et al., 2016). Second, previous research 
on the CG-ID relationship has usually focused on individual mechanisms of firms’ 
corporate governance framework (ownership structure, board structure, etc.). Unlike 
other meta-analytic techniques, MASEM allows us to shed light on the role played by 
each governance mechanisms while accounting for interdependencies with other 
mechanisms. As shown in the literature, corporate governance mechanisms are not 
independent, being related to one another by forms of complementarity and 
substitutability (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2008). Third, MASEM allows us to provide new 
insights on the CG-ID relationship also by testing novel theory-developing hypotheses 
focused on country-level contingencies potentially moderating the main relationship. 
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Four main findings emerge from our study. First, the causal relationship between 
corporate governance and international diversification is bidirectional and multifaceted in 
nature. Second, corporate governance explains the degree of international diversification 
better than international diversification explains the activation of corporate governance 
mechanisms. Third, the nature of the causal linkages between corporate governance and 
international diversification changes depending on whether the focus is on the depth or 
breadth of foreign expansion. Fourth, both directions of causality in the CG-ID 
relationship are moderated by the home-country institutional context and, in particular, 
by the legal shareholder protection and the national uncertainty avoidance. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we develop our model by discussing 
from a theoretical perspective the influence of corporate governance on the degree of 
international diversification as well as the effects of international diversification on the 
activation of corporate governance mechanisms. Next, we explain the meta-analytic 
methodology employed (i.e., MASEM), the data, and the results. Finally, we conclude 
with a discussion of our results and promising avenues for future research on the CG-ID 
relationship. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
In order to develop our theoretical arguments, we draw on the corporate governance and 
international management literatures and adopt primarily the agency theory and resource 
perspectives. Given our focus on the CG-ID relationship, the two main theoretical 
constructs explored in this study are corporate governance and international 
diversification. From a managerial perspective, corporate governance is defined as the set 
of “formal structures, informal structures, and processes that exist in oversight roles and 
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responsibilities in the corporate context” (Hambrick, et al. 2008, p. 381; see also Aguilera 
et al., 2015). Herein, we focus on the following corporate governance mechanisms: 
ownership concentration, institutional ownership, board independence, board size, 
separation of CEO and chairman roles, inside ownership, CEO compensation, and CEO 
tenure. International diversification is defined as the size of a firm’s foreign operations 
(e.g., Hennart, 2011). Depth of international diversification refers to the extent to which a 
firm relies on its foreign operations, while breadth refers to the geographic scope of a 
firm’s foreign footprint (e.g., George et al., 2005). 
Effects of corporate governance on the degree of international diversification 
Effects of corporate governance mechanisms on the degree of international 
diversification may be explained by agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Eisenhardt, 
1989) and the resource perspective on corporate governance (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
Corporate governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem. The 
overarching prediction of an agency theory perspective on the CG-ID relationship posits 
that a reduction of agency problems by means of appropriate corporate governance 
mechanisms has a positive effect on the degree of international diversification. 
International diversification is characterized by unusual uncertainty about performance 
outcomes (e.g., Hymer, 1960; Zaheer, 1995). The strategic nature of international 
diversification turns that uncertainty into significant risks for firms, since this strategy 
implies long-term commitment to a certain path that is potentially costly to reverse 
(Caves, 1984; Ghemawat, 1991). The principal-agent perspective, hence, suggests that 
managers’ risk aversion may limit the extent of firms’ expansion abroad (e.g., Lien et al. 
2005; Filatotchev et al. 2008). By doing so, managers pursue higher job security and 
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more certain rewards (Ellstrand et al., 2002), albeit shareholders likely prefer courses of 
actions that maximize returns, even when accompanied by higher risk (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). By curbing the agency problem and thus restraining the effects of 
managers’ risk aversion, such corporate governance mechanisms as ownership 
concentration (e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), institutional ownership (e.g., Tihanyi et al., 
2003), board independence (e.g., Bhagat & Black, 2002), separation of CEO and 
chairman roles (e.g., Rechner & Dalton, 1991), inside ownership (e.g., Jensen & Murphy, 
1990), and CEO compensation (e.g., Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997) may favor a 
higher degree of international diversification. 
Research based on agency theory points out that some of these corporate 
governance mechanisms lower the intensity of the agency problem by increasing the 
monitoring of managerial behavior (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). First, ownership 
concentration may reduce the extent of self-serving behavior by mangers, who may 
attempt to avoid the risks rather than pursue the potential long-term opportunities 
associated with expansion abroad (Bolton & von Thadden, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986). Ownership concentration may be an effective governance mechanism closing the 
gap between ownership and control, thus having important implications for 
internationalization decisions. Concentrated ownership reduces the information 
asymmetries between owners and managers and, as a result, increase owners’ ability to 
monitor and control managers. Furthermore, concentrated ownership increases owners’ 
stake in the firm. Large and often undiversified owners have a greater incentive to 
monitor and control mangers, in order to limit the self-serving actions affecting the 
pursuit of organizational goals. Finally, concentrated ownership provides owners with the 
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means to restrain managerial opportunism, as they have the power to dismiss managers 
based on their performance. In sum, by increasing ability, incentive, and power to 
monitor and control managers, ownership concentration may offset managerial risk-
aversion and encourage the search of economic opportunities abroad. 
Second, from an agency theory perspective, institutional ownership may also 
favor firms’ expansion abroad. Institutional investors have the incentive to encourage 
investees’ international diversification because they generally have and aim to maintain 
globally diversified, low-risk portfolios (e.g., Lien et al., 2005; Singh & Gaur, 2013). 
Moreover, institutional investors are often pressure-resistant investors, who do not have 
strong business connections with their investee firms (e.g., David et al., 1998; Tihanyi et 
al., 2003). This gives them the freedom to promote the adoption of corporate governance 
best practices (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 2002; Lien et al., 2005). Further, institutional 
investors are usually endowed with superior monitoring abilities, which they employ to 
scrutinize firms’ strategic decision-making process (e.g., Filatotchev et al., 2007). As a 
result, institutional ownership may reduce the agency problems associated with 
managerial discretion. This implies, inter alia, a positive effect on managerial risk-taking 
and, thus, on investees’ degree of international diversification. 
Third, arguments based on agency theory commonly posit that outside and, in 
particular, independent directors play an important role in monitoring and controlling 
managerial actions (Bhagat & Black, 2002). Such monitoring role may prevent risk-
averse managers from forgoing the economic opportunities associated with international 
diversification. Extant corporate governance research shows that the number of inside 
directors sitting on the board is negatively associated with the level of political risk 
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present in a firm’s portfolio of foreign investments (Ellstrand et al., 2002). The 
theoretical argument explaining this negative association is that inside directors, being 
part of the top management team, tend to favor strategic alternatives that meet their risk 
preferences. By contrast, outside and, in particular, independent directors can properly 
exercise their monitoring function over managerial behavior, given the absence of any 
kind of connections with the firm and its executive team. Therefore, by extending this 
line of research, one may reasonably expect that the number of outside and, in particular, 
independent directors may positively affect the degree of international diversification as 
well. 
Fourth, according to a principal-agent perspective, CEO duality weakens the 
monitoring process within firms’ corporate governance framework. CEOs that are also 
chairmen of the board are in a stronger position to control the strategic decision-making 
process (Boyd, 1995; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). As a result, they tend to promote 
cautious courses of action to protect their position. Empirical evidence shows that CEO 
duality is negatively related to the level of political risk of firms’ investments abroad 
(Ellstrand et al., 2002). Similarly, one may predict that CEO duality has a negative effect 
on the degree of international diversification or, equivalently, the separation of CEO and 
chairman roles positively influences the extent of expansion abroad. 
Research based on agency theory points out that, in addition to those concerning 
monitoring, mechanisms focused on interest alignment may decrease the intensity of the 
agency problem (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). First, inside ownership aligns the risk 
preferences and interests of the managers with those of the owners, as long-term firm 
performance becomes a primary factor determining their wealth. Research shows that 
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such alignment enhances managers’ propensity to export (Lu et al., 2009) as well as to 
opt for a riskier entry mode (i.e., acquisition) when investing in a certain host country 
(Lai et al., 2012). This logic suggests, hence, that alignment of interests may reduce the 
self-serving risk aversion of managers and prompt the pursuit of the advantages 
associated with expansion abroad, thus increasing the degree of international 
diversification of the firm. 
Second, the level of total CEO compensation may help overcome the agency 
problem resulting from managerial risk aversion. By resorting to higher remuneration, 
firms may attempt to compensate CEOs in advance for the risks associated with 
expansion abroad. Therefore, one may expect that higher CEO compensation will result 
in a higher degree of international diversification. 
The above arguments, based on agency theory, lead to the following general 
causal prediction: 
Hypothesis 1: Corporate governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem 
positively affect the degree of international diversification. 
Specifically, we predict the following: 
Hypothesis 1a: Ownership concentration positively affects the degree of 
international diversification. 
Hypothesis 1b: Institutional ownership positively affects the degree of 
international diversification. 
Hypothesis 1c: Board independence positively affects the degree of international 
diversification. 
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Hypothesis 1d: The separation of CEO and chairman positions positively affects 
the degree of international diversification. 
Hypothesis 1e: Inside ownership positively affects the degree of international 
diversification. 
Hypothesis 1f: The level of CEO compensation positively affects the degree of 
international diversification. 
Corporate governance mechanisms providing better access to organizational 
and managerial resources. Besides agency theory, the resource perspective on corporate 
governance helps explain the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on the 
degree of international diversification. The overarching prediction of a resource 
perspective on the CG-ID relationship posits that a better access to organizational and 
managerial resources by means of appropriate corporate governance mechanisms has a 
positive effect on the degree of international diversification. Research points out that 
corporate governance mechanisms may not only play monitoring and control functions, 
but also contribute to the decision-making process. For example, corporate governance 
may support firms in a number of complex strategic processes (e.g., product and 
international diversification, M&As, turnarounds) by facilitating firms’ access to 
organizational and managerial resources such as international experience, industry 
expertise, functional skills, and professional networks (e.g., Filatotchev et al., 2001; 
Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). This means that corporate governance mechanisms may 
change top executives’ attitude about internationalization and increase their propensity to 
undertake foreign direct investments. First, board size is a mechanism that may favor 
higher degrees of international diversification, since it expands the amount and diversity 
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of the human and relational capital available for the strategic decision-making process 
(e.g., Filatotchev et al., 2008; Lien et al., 2005; Lu et al., 2009). Second, longer tenure 
may better equip CEOs to cope with the challenges of such a resource-intensive and risky 
move as international diversification (e.g., Kirca et al., 2012). Even though longer tenure 
results in greater managerial discretion, which makes monitoring more difficult (e.g., 
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Hambrick et al., 1993), long-tenured CEOs may be more 
willing to expand abroad because, over time, they have developed greater managerial 
skills and acquired deeper knowledge of the firm and its industry (e.g., Hambrick & 
Fukutomi, 1991; Kirca et al., 2012). 
The above arguments, based on the resource perspective, lead to the following 
general causal prediction: 
Hypothesis 2: Corporate governance mechanisms providing better access to 
organizational and managerial resources positively affect the degree of 
international diversification. 
Specifically, we predict the following: 
Hypothesis 2a: Board size positively affects the degree of international 
diversification. 
Hypothesis 2b: CEO tenure positively affects the degree of international 
diversification. 
Figure 2.1 offers a representation of our theoretical model linking corporate 
governance to the degree of international diversification. 
 96 
 
Effects of the degree of international diversification on corporate governance 
Effects of the degree of international diversification on corporate governance are 
predicted by agency theory (e.g., Jensen & Meckling 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989), 
information-processing theory (e.g., Daft & Lengel, 1986; Galbraith, 1974; Thompson, 
1967), and the institution-based resource perspective (e.g., Kostova et al., 2008; Marano 
& Kostova, 2016). 
Agency theory perspective on the effects of international diversification. As 
discussed earlier, agency theory helps explain the effects of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the degree of international diversification. However, it also explains the 
opposite causality direction (e.g., Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). The overarching 
prediction of an agency theory perspective on the ID-CG relationship posits that the 
degree of international diversification, by affecting the intensity of the agency problem, 
will be positively related to the use of certain corporate governance mechanisms. 
Scholars have pointed out that agency problems tend to exacerbate when the complexity 
confronting the firm increases (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Roth & 
O’Donnell, 1996). Higher firm complexity aggravates information asymmetries between 
managers and owners, since it requires more specialized knowledge about the firm and its 
task environment that will likely be available to managers, but not to owners (e.g., 
Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Roth & O’Donnell, 1996). Moreover, firm complexity is 
usually associated with a larger number of decision options and more ambiguous causal 
relationships (e.g., Roth & O’Donnell, 1996). As a result, managerial discretion increases 
and monitoring managerial behavior becomes more difficult (e.g., Hambrick & 
Finkelstein, 1987; Rajagopalan & Finkelstein, 1992). By increasing firm complexity, 
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international diversification aggravates the principal-agent conflict, thus prompting the 
use of corporate governance mechanisms that strengthen the monitoring of managerial 
behavior as well as the alignment of interests between owners and managers (e.g., 
Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). First, when increasing their degree of international 
diversification, firms may resort to higher board independence (e.g., Luo, 2005). As 
noted above, corporate governance scholars commonly argue that outside and, in 
particular, independent directors play an important role in monitoring and controlling 
managerial actions (Bhagat & Black, 2002). Second, greater expansion abroad may result 
in larger inside ownership, which aligns―as we previously noted―the risk preferences 
and interests of the managers with those of the owners. 
Information-processing perspective on the effects of international 
diversification. Strictly related to the agency theory perspective on the ID-CG 
relationship is the information-processing perspective. The overarching prediction of an 
information-processing perspective on the ID-CG relationship posits that the increase in 
information-processing demands resulting from a higher degree of international 
diversification will (contribute to) activate some corporate governance 
mechanisms―which we term here information-processing enablers. Management 
scholars adopting an information-processing perspective view firms as open social 
systems that need to deal with complexity by collecting and processing relevant 
information (e.g., Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). The 
information-processing demands confronting top executives are therefore determined by 
the level of complexity that the firm needs to cope with (e.g., Daft & Lengel, 1986; 
Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996). Such complexity is affected by a number of factors, 
 98 
 
including the degree of international diversification (e.g., Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Roth 
& O’Donnell, 1996; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). First, international diversification is 
often a strategic implication of product diversification (e.g., Denis et al., 2002) and 
vertical integration (e.g., Teece, 1981, 1985), both of which are positively related to 
firms’ internal complexity (e.g., Chandler, 1962; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996). 
Second, the decision to expand internationally implies that firms may need to cope with 
potentially unfamiliar host country environments, limited relevant knowledge, and the 
effects of cultural, administrative, geographic, and economic distance between home and 
host countries (Eden & Miller, 2001; Ghemawat, 2001; Kostova, 1999). Put differently, 
firms’ liability of foreignness may result in less effective business decisions than those 
made by local firms (Hymer, 1960; Mezias, 2002; Zaheer, 1995). The complexity 
ensuing from the liability of foreignness intensifies along with increases in the degree of 
international diversification, since the volume and diversity of external environmental 
stimuli expand (e.g., Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Third, the internationally diversified 
firms need to manage (effectively) the strategic interdependence among their subunits. 
When adopting a global or transnational strategy, a significant degree of interdependence 
exists among the subunits (Kostova & Roth, 2003). Even when internationally diversified 
firms do not derive their benefits from an integrated and standardized approach (i.e., 
when adopting a multinational strategy), there still is a certain amount of interdependence 
among the subunits, due to such factors as visibility and legitimacy spillovers (Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999). Fourth, as a result of subunit interdependence, internationally diversified 
firms need to continuously handle the internal tensions and conflicts arising whenever 
inter-unit boundaries are crossed in everyday activities. Indeed, those boundaries 
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represent the loci where “‘localized’ contestations are likely to erupt, because the units 
[…] are guided by a different set of goals, practices, and priorities” (Raynard, 2014: 13). 
By increasing firm complexity and thus the information-processing demands, 
international diversification may contribute to activate the corporate governance 
mechanisms that enable information processing within the firm (e.g., Oxelheim et al. 
2013; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). First, larger boards may expand the overall 
information-processing capacity of the firm, due to the higher number of members 
composing them (e.g., Luo, 2005; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Hence, board size may be 
expected to grow as the firm increases the size of its foreign footprint. Second, longer 
tenure in the firm provides CEOs with greater knowledge of the firm and its task 
environment (e.g., Herrmann & Datta, 2006), making them more equipped to confront 
the information-processing demands resulting from international expansion. Thus, from 
an information-processing perspective, CEO tenure may be positively related to the 
degree of international diversification. Third, corporate governance research has shown 
that the volume of information-processing demands positively affects the level of CEO 
compensation, since information-processing is a critical task for firm survival and success 
and the ability to process a larger and more complex amount of information is likely to be 
a scarce and valuable skill (e.g., Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996). This implies that a 
greater degree of international diversification is positively associated with a higher level 
of CEO pay (e.g., Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Fourth, the separation of CEO and 
chairman positions may increase the information-processing capacity, by spreading 
power and expanding the number of people involved in the strategic decision-making 
process (e.g., Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). By increasing the information-processing 
 100 
 
demands for the firm, the degree of international diversification is therefore expected to 
increase the likelihood that CEO and chairman positions are separated. 
When investigating the ID-CG relationship, the agency theory and information-
processing perspectives stress deliberate responses by firms to the complexity associated 
with larger foreign footprints. In particular, those perspectives point out the intentional 
actions that firms take in order to shape their corporate governance framework during or 
after the internationalization process. This implies that those actions focus on corporate 
governance mechanisms that can be controlled by the firm. Though not fully under the 
control of the firm, ownership concentration and institutional ownership may 
nevertheless be affected by the degree of international diversification. Institutional 
investors generally have and aim to maintain globally diversified, low-risk portfolios 
(e.g., Lien et al., 2005; Singh & Gaur, 2013). Consequently, as the firm expands its 
presence abroad, its attractiveness to institutional investors increases; in turn, greater 
attractiveness will result in higher institutional ownership and, hence, lower ownership 
concentration (e.g., Luo, 2005). Furthermore, institutional ownership represents another 
theoretical mechanism through which international diversification influences the adoption 
of corporate governance practices addressing principal-agent conflicts. Institutional 
owners are characterized by dual identity (Pratt & Foreman, 2000), since they are 
principals also serving as agents for those providing them the funds to invest (Arthurs et 
al., 2008; Hoskisson et al., 2013). Such dual identity is a primary driver of shareholder 
activism, since it prompts institutional owners to be more effective monitors of investees’ 
executives in order to protect the interests of their principals (e.g., Useem, 1996). For 
example, Samsung Group’s decision to separate the CEO and chairman positions at eight 
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of its companies was the “latest attempt to bolster its corporate governance in the wake of 
shareholder criticism” (Wall Street Journal, 2016). 
Resource perspective on the effects of international diversification. When the 
degree of international diversification increases, another mechanism affects the adoption 
of corporate governance practices curtailing the principal-agent conflict. International 
diversification implies greater exposure to alternative organizational practices in a variety 
of domains (e.g., corporate governance, labor relations, corporate social responsibility, 
human resource management, finance, firm-government relations). Such practices may be 
institutionalized either in the host countries where the firm operates or in the 
transnational meta-institutional field (e.g., Kostova et al., 2008). Kostova and her 
colleagues argue that the transnational meta-institutional field is “very broad and narrow 
at the same time. It is broad in the sense that it encompasses MNCs in general, but it is 
narrow with regard to the number and scope of institutionalized values and practices that 
it enforces” (2008: 998). In a limited number of domains, including principal-agent 
conflicts, internationally diversified firms confront expectations and requirements that are 
transnational in nature. When internationally diversified firms fail to meet those 
expectations and requirements, negative legitimacy spillovers across the meta-
institutional field may significantly harm their operations in multiple countries (e.g., 
Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Certain corporate governance practices addressing the 
principal-agent conflict have gone through a transnational institutionalization process 
over the last quarter of a century. This is reflected, for instance, in the spread around the 
world of codes of good governance that in most of the cases include some universal 
recommendations based on agency theory (e.g., Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; 
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Cuomo et al., 2016). Hence, internationally diversified firms may adopt those 
institutionalized corporate governance practices in order to establish or maintain 
legitimacy in the meta-institutional field and avoid the sanctions resulting from deviant 
behavior (e.g., Kostova et al., 2008). It is worth emphasizing that pressures from the 
meta-institutional field may result in the implementation of certain corporate governance 
practices, but not necessarily in their internalization (e.g., Kostova & Roth, 2002). For 
example, when Samsung Group announced the split of the CEO and chairman positions 
of the board at eight of its companies, a research analyst with expertise in South Korean 
boards described the move as “a symbolic change” (The Wall Street Journal, 2016). This 
allows us to emphasize that, while our focus is on corporate governance practices 
addressing the principal-agent conflict, the agency theory and institution-based resource 
perspectives do not necessarily suggest the same degree of adoption of those practices. 
The institutionalization process of corporate governance practices addressing the 
agency problem originated and enhanced in Western developed countries (e.g., Aguilera 
& Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). However, as the aforementioned example about Samsung and 
CEO duality illustrates, the relevance of those practices is global by now, meaning that 
expectations in the meta-institutional field concern firms from both developed and 
developing countries. First, since the late 1990s, transnational organizations, such as the 
ICGN and the OECD, created codes in order to improve corporate governance practices 
around the world; moreover, the World Bank actively engaged in the promotion of good 
governance in multiple countries (e.g., Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Cuomo et al., 
2016). Second, during the same period, an increasing number of developing countries has 
developed corporate governance codes (e.g., Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Cuomo 
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et al., 2016). Third, privatization in many developing countries has resulted in corporate 
governance changes within newly-privatized firms: on the one hand, the adoption of 
corporate governance practices reducing agency problems has been an important factor 
contributing to the attraction of foreign capital and, on the other hand, foreign 
shareholders have pushed for corporate governance changes in order to protect their 
interests (e.g., Filatotchev & Wright, 2011; Guedhami et al., 2009). Fourth, firms from 
developing countries are increasingly more internationally diversified (UNCTAD, 2015). 
Marano and her colleagues argue that higher international diversification favors the 
development of “organizational identities as global actors in meta-institutional fields” and 
this should make them “more attentive to meta-institutional pressures and more receptive 
to adopting legitimate global practices” (2016b: 6). 
The above arguments point out the relevance of the institution-based resource 
perspective when examining the ID-CG relationship. By exposing the firm to alternative 
corporate governance practices, international diversification provides opportunities for 
learning (e.g., Baum et al., 2000). The meta-institutional field ‘constrains’ firms to adopt 
certain corporate governance practices in order to maintain legitimacy. However, by 
doing so, it also ‘enables’ firms to experience different practices and, thus, to develop 
knowledge concerning their implementation and integration within the organization (e.g., 
Marano & Kostova, 2016). This enabling effect does not involve institutional agency and 
institutional change (e.g., Saka-Helmhout & Geppert, 2011; Seo & Creed, 2002); rather, 
it concerns the accumulation within the firm of knowledge in the corporate governance 
domain. This may occur, for example, through observation of the other firms in the meta-
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institutional field, or through the transfer of knowledge from institutional owners (e.g., 
Dau, 2013). 
The above arguments, based on the agency theory, information-processing, and 
resource perspectives on the ID-CG relationship, lead to the following general causal 
prediction: 
Hypothesis 3: The degree of international diversification positively affects the 
activation of corporate governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem 
and/or increasing the information-processing capacity of the firm. 
Specifically, we predict the following: 
Hypothesis 3a: The degree of international diversification positively affects 
ownership concentration. 
Hypothesis 3b: The degree of international diversification positively affects 
institutional ownership. 
Hypothesis 3c: The degree of international diversification positively affects board 
independence. 
Hypothesis 3d: The degree of international diversification positively affects the 
separation of CEO and chairman positions. 
Hypothesis 3e: The degree of international diversification positively affects inside 
ownership. 
Hypothesis 3f: The degree of international diversification positively affects the 
level of CEO compensation. 
Hypothesis 3g: The degree of international diversification positively affects board 
size. 
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Hypothesis 3h: The degree of international diversification positively affects CEO 
tenure. 
Figure 2.2 offers a representation of our theoretical model linking the degree of 
international diversification to corporate governance. 
Role of depth and breadth of firms’ degree of international diversification 
As suggested by international management scholars, international diversification is a 
multidimensional construct (e.g., Hitt et al., 2006). Specifically, depth and breadth are 
two distinct dimensions of firms’ foreign footprint (e.g., George et al., 2005; Kafouros et 
al., 2012). Depth refers to the scale of foreign activities, i.e., the extent of business 
operations abroad (e.g., Thomas & Eden, 2004). Breadth, by contrast, refers to the scope 
of the international expansion, i.e., the geographic reach around the world (e.g., Lu & 
Beamish, 2004). These two dimensions, though interdependent, are characterized by 
peculiar theoretical implications and, therefore, we suggest that distinguishing them may 
be particularly relevant in the context of the CG-ID relationship. From an agency theory 
perspective, the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the depth and breadth of 
international diversification may differ, since managers’ risk preferences may reflect in 
different attitudes towards the two dimensions. By definition, higher levels of breadth 
entail dispersion of business operations across a larger number of host countries and 
regions (e.g., George et al., 2005; Kafouros et al., 2012). This greater dispersion 
intensifies the uncertainty about performance outcomes and the associated risks for firms 
more than depth does. The implications of managers’ risk aversion in terms of suboptimal 
foreign expansion, thus, may be more pronounced for decisions concerning the level of 
breadth, rather than that of depth. Also from a resource perspective, firms’ corporate 
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governance framework may have a greater impact on the breadth of international 
diversification than on the depth. The better access to organizational and managerial 
resources that certain corporate governance mechanisms provide, such as international 
experience, industry expertise, and professional networks, may prove particularly 
important when coping with the multiplicity and heterogeneity of external environments 
associated with higher levels of breadth (e.g., Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Hence, from a 
resource perspective, corporate governance mechanisms may affect top executives’ 
reluctance to increase the geographical reach of the firm more than their disinclination to 
expand the scale of foreign operations. 
The above arguments, based on the agency theory and resource perspectives, lead 
to the following general causal predictions: 
Hypothesis 4: The positive effect of corporate governance mechanisms addressing 
the agency problem is stronger on the breadth than on the depth of international 
diversification. 
Hypothesis 5: The positive effect of corporate governance mechanisms providing 
better access to organizational and managerial resources is stronger on the 
breadth than on the depth of international diversification. 
The agency theory, information-processing, and resource perspectives suggest 
that the effect on corporate governance of depth and breadth of international 
diversification may differ. From an agency theory perspective, one may argue that a 
greater geographical outreach aggravates information asymmetries between managers 
and owners more than a larger scale of foreign operations, due to the higher external and 
internal complexity confronting the firm (e.g., Roth & O’Donnell, 1996; Sanders & 
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Carpenter, 1998). Moreover, from an information-processing perspective, the higher 
complexity that breadth implies in comparison to depth results in greater information-
processing demands posed to the firm. More serious information asymmetries and greater 
information-processing demands, in turn, may represent a stronger spur toward the 
activation of corporate governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem and/or 
enabling information processing within the firm (e.g., Oxelheim et al. 2013). From a 
resource perspective, the exposure to alternative organizational practices in a variety of 
domains (including corporate governance) is, by definition, greater when expanding the 
breadth of international diversification than when intensifying the depth. The stronger 
learning effect associated with wider geographical reach allows firms to develop better 
knowledge concerning the implementation and integration of those practices within the 
organization, thus favoring their adoption (e.g., Marano & Kostova, 2016). 
The above arguments, based on the agency theory, information-processing, and 
resource perspectives on the ID-CG relationship, lead to the following general causal 
prediction: 
Hypothesis 6: The positive effect on the activation of corporate governance 
mechanisms addressing the agency problem and/or increasing the information-
processing capacity of the firm is stronger for the breadth than for the depth of 
international diversification. 
Effects of country-level moderators 
Prior research says little on potential moderators altering the causal linkages between 
corporate governance and international diversification. Below, from an agency theory 
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perspective, we explore the potential moderating role of two country-level contingencies, 
namely the legal protection of minority shareholders and uncertainty avoidance. 
Legal protection of minority shareholders. Around the world, the adoption of 
certain corporate governance mechanisms may be the outcome of rules, i.e., hard law 
(e.g., Aguilera et al., 2010, 2012; Hopt, 2011). The law and finance literature points out 
the importance of corporate law in protecting minority investors (e.g., La Porta et al., 
1998, 2000). Since the early 1980s, several countries have increased the level of legal 
protection of minority shareholders; still, significant differences across countries remain 
(e.g., Guillen & Capron, 2016; O’Sullivan, 2003). Herein, we argue that the role played 
by soft corporate governance mechanisms on international diversification decisions may 
vary, depending on the extent to which corporate law limits the agency costs incurred by 
minority shareholders. As pointed out by some scholars, corporate governance 
mechanisms may operate as substitutes, based on efficiency considerations in the quest 
for the optimal organization of the firm (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Dalton et al., 
2003; Demsetz, 1983; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014; Rediker & Seth, 1995; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). Building on corporate governance research on substitutability, we suggest 
that the effect of soft corporate governance mechanisms on the extent of foreign 
expansion may be stronger when voids in countries’ regulatory context (e.g., Khanna et 
al., 2005) result in weaker legal protection from managerial opportunism. 
The above arguments, based on the agency theory perspective, lead to the 
following general causal prediction: 
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Hypothesis 7: The positive effect of (soft) corporate governance mechanisms 
addressing the agency problem on the degree of international diversification 
weakens as the level of legal minority shareholder protection increases. 
The legal protection of minority shareholders may moderate also the opposite 
causal relationship. As discussed previously, international diversification, by aggravating 
the principal-agent conflict, prompts the use of corporate governance mechanisms that 
strengthen the monitoring of managerial behavior as well as the alignment of interests 
between owners and managers (e.g., Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Building again on 
substitutability research, we suggest that, when the legal protection of minority 
shareholders is higher, the push toward the activation of soft corporate governance 
mechanisms is weaker, because the regulatory context already provides shareholders a 
shield against managerial opportunism. 
The above arguments, based on the agency theory perspective, lead to the 
following general causal prediction: 
Hypothesis 8: The positive effect of the degree of international diversification on 
the activation of (soft) corporate governance mechanisms addressing the agency 
problem weakens as the level of legal minority shareholder protection increases. 
Uncertainty avoidance. Uncertainty avoidance, one of the dimensions of national 
culture identified by Hofstede, refers to “the extent to which a culture programs its 
members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. 
Unstructured situations are novel, unknown, surprising, different from usual” (Hofstede, 
2001: xix). While Hofstede points out that “uncertainty avoidance does not equal risk 
avoidance” (2001: 148, italics in the original), we argue that, when focusing on the effect 
 110 
 
of corporate governance on international diversification, the two constructs are strictly 
interconnected. As discussed earlier, international diversification is characterized by 
unusual uncertainty about performance outcomes, due to the liability of foreignness that 
firms expanding abroad need to deal with (Ghemawat, 2001; Hymer, 1960; Mezias, 
2002; Zaheer, 1995). The strategic nature of international diversification turns that 
uncertainty into significant risks for firms, since this strategy implies long-term 
commitment to a certain path that is potentially costly to reverse (Caves, 1984; 
Ghemawat, 1991). We therefore suggest that, when uncertainty avoidance is higher, the 
effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the degree of international diversification 
is weaker, as the increase in uncertainty avoidance reflects in higher managerial aversion 
to the risks associated with foreign expansion. 
The above arguments, based on the agency theory perspective, lead to the 
following general causal prediction: 
Hypothesis 9: The positive effect of corporate governance mechanisms addressing 
the agency problem on the degree of international diversification weakens as the 
level of uncertainty avoidance increases. 
METHODOLOGY 
In order to investigate the CG-ID relationship we used MASEM, which combines the 
techniques of structural equation modeling with those of meta-analysis (e.g., Cheung & 
Chan, 2005; van Essen et al., 2015a). In particular, we followed the guidelines recently 
outlined by Bergh and his colleagues (2016) for using MASEM to advance management 
research. MASEM represents a more powerful technique than traditional meta-analysis, 
as it allows to build on the existing body of empirical research (in our case focused on 
 111 
 
corporate governance and international diversification) in order to pit alternative complex 
models (Bergh et al., 2016). 
As a first step, we conducted a review of the management, economics, and 
finance literatures to identify key theoretical perspectives on the CG-ID relationship and 
all relevant study variables. After consulting studies that provide comprehensive reviews 
of research on corporate governance (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2015; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) 
and international diversification (e.g., Hitt et al., 2006), we carried out an extensive 
review of the literature on the CG-ID relationship (e.g., Filatotchev & Wright, 2011; 
Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). This effort allowed us to identify the following relevant 
corporate governance variables: ownership concentration, institutional ownership, board 
independence, board size, separation of CEO and chairman positions, CEO tenure, CEO 
pay, and inside ownership. We used those constructs to develop our theoretical arguments 
about the CG-ID relationship, formulate our hypotheses, and thus identify a priori (Bergh 
et al., 2016: 481) the general models to be tested. Those models are 1) the direct effects 
model linking corporate governance mechanisms to the degree of international 
diversification, based on Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2; 2) the direct effects model 
linking the degree of international diversification to corporate governance mechanisms, 
based on Hypothesis 3. 
Sample and coding 
Our sample consists of published and unpublished empirical studies analyzing the CG-ID 
relationship, though not necessarily focused, from a theoretical perspective, on such 
relationship. In order to identify as many relevant primary studies as possible, we 
implemented multiple search strategies. First, we consulted several review articles (e.g., 
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Filatotchev & Wright, 2011; Wu & Tihanyi, 2013). Second, we explored four major 
electronic databases by conducting keyword searches focused on corporate governance 
and international diversification. The electronic databases are the following: ABI Inform, 
Business Source Premier, JSTOR, and Web of Science. We used the following search 
terms: “corporate governance,” “governance,” “ownership structure”, “ownership 
concentration,” “institutional ownership,”  “board of directors,” “board composition,” 
“board structure,” “board independence,” “board size,” “CEO/chief executive,” “CEO 
duality,” “CEO tenure,” “CEO pay,” “CEO compensation,” and “inside ownership” with 
regard to corporate governance (e.g., Bergh et al., 2016; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011); 
“MNC,” “internationalization,” “international diversification,” “geographic 
diversification,” “geographic expansion,” “international expansion,” and 
“multinationality,” with regard to international diversification (e.g., Hitt et al., 2006; 
Kirca et al., 2011). Third, using the initial set of studies collected through these two 
search strategies, we identified relevant papers among those cited in the previously 
retrieved articles and those citing them. In order to that, we used Google Scholar and 
Web of Science. Combined, these strategies yielded an initial pool of over 4,000 papers 
and a final sample of 104 primary studies. Each of the articles in the final sample 
involved an empirical analysis, included the necessary statistical information (i.e., 
bivariate correlation coefficients and sample size), and used corporate governance and 
international diversification measures that reflected conventional definitions of the 
correspondent constructs (Bergh et al., 2016). In order to ensure that dependence of 
samples would not represent a major problem in our analyses, we checked whether any 
primary studies were authored by the same scholars and based on the same empirical 
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sample. We did not find any cases. Despite that, sample dependence may still be an issue 
because primary studies may rely on the same large and accessible databases. However, 
our final sample includes articles published over two decades (from 2000 to 2016), 
covering a period of over forty years (1970-2012), and from different disciplines, thus 
reasonably increasing the variation in data sources at satisfactory levels (Bergh et al., 
2016). Next, we read the sampled articles, developed a coding protocol (Lipsey & 
Wilson, 2001), and collected data concerning the relationships of interest as well as the 
study characteristics. 
Measures 
Corporate governance mechanisms. Based on our extensive review of the 
literature on corporate governance and international diversification (e.g., Aguilera et al., 
2015; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Wu & Tihanyi, 2013), we 
identified eight commonly studied corporate governance mechanisms: ownership 
concentration, institutional ownership, board independence, board size, separation of 
CEO and chairman positions, CEO tenure, CEO pay, and inside ownership. Ownership 
concentration reflects the extent to which the firm’s outstanding stock is in the hands of 
large shareholders. It is commonly measured as the percentage of the firm’s equity held 
by those who own at least 3% or 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares, or the percentage of 
shares held by the largest shareholders (e.g., Boubakri et al., 2005; La Porta et al., 1998; 
Wan et al., 2008). Institutional ownership represents the extent to which the firm’s 
outstanding shares are in the hands of institutional investors. It is commonly measured as 
the percentage of the firm’s equity held by institutional investors, or the number of 
institutional investors owning a firm’s stock (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 2002; Johnson & 
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Greening, 1999; Tihanyi et al., 2003). Board independence reflects the degree to which 
the board of directors operates independently from corporate insiders. It is commonly 
measured as the ratio of (independent) outside directors to the total number of board 
members (e.g., Bhagat & Black, 2002; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Tihanyi et al., 2003). 
Board size measures how large the board of directors is and is commonly measured as the 
number of directors sitting on the firm’s board (e.g., Dalton et al., 1999; Sanders & 
Carpenter, 1998). Separation of CEO and chairman positions refers to whether the CEO 
has a tighter control of the firm’s strategic decision-making process. It is commonly 
measured as a dummy variable taking value of 1 if the positions are held by different 
board members and 0 if the same person jointly holds the two titles (e.g., Boyd, 1995; 
Rechner & Dalton, 1991). CEO tenure reflects the continuity in the strategic management 
of the firm. It is commonly measured as the number of years since the appointment of the 
CEO (e.g., Bergh, 2016). CEO pay refers to the remuneration granted to the chief 
executive. It is commonly measured as the level of compensation of the CEO (e.g., 
Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Inside ownership represents the extent to which the firm’s 
outstanding shares are in the hands of corporate insiders. It is commonly measured as the 
percentage of equity owned by inside directors or members of the top management team 
(e.g., Hoskisson et al., 2002). 
Degree of international diversification. The degree of international 
diversification refers to the size of firms’ foreign footprint, i.e., the extent to which one or 
more value chain activities are performed abroad. International management scholars 
have operationalized the construct in a number of ways (e.g., Lu & Beamish, 2004; 
Sullivan, 1994; Thomas & Eden, 2004). Foreign sales to total sales (e.g., Tallman & Li, 
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1996), foreign assets to total assets (e.g., Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999), foreign 
employees to total employees (e.g., Brock & Yaffe, 2008), foreign subsidiaries to total 
subsidiaries (e.g., Gomez-Mejia & Palich, 1997), and total exports to total sales (e.g., Lu 
& Beamish, 2001) are common measures of the depth of international diversification, i.e., 
the scale of the activities that are conducted outside the home country (e.g., Thomas & 
Eden, 2004). Number of countries (e.g., Delios & Beamish, 1999), number of regions 
(e.g., Kim, Hoskisson, & Wan, 2004), dispersion across countries (e.g., Goerzen & 
Beamish, 2003), and dispersion across regions (e.g., Hitt et al., 1997) are common 
measures of the breadth of international diversification, i.e., the geographic scope of a 
firm’s foreign operations (e.g., Thomas & Eden, 2004). 
Legal protection of minority shareholders. We measured the legal protection of 
minority shareholder using the index developed by Guillen and Capron (2016). The index 
was developed using cross-country longitudinal data from 78 developed and developing 
countries, covering the 1970-2011 period. The two scholars gathered information on ten 
legal provisions regarded as key for the protection of minority shareholder rights, 
including, among others, board independence, feasibility of directors’ dismissal, 
derivative suit, and disclosure of major share ownership: “If present, each of these legal 
provisions provides minority shareholders with a comprehensive set of protections 
against the actions of large shareholders and/or management and in the event of a change 
in corporate control” (Guillen and Capron, 2016: 136). The index ranges from 0 to 10, 
with each legal provision receiving a score between 0 and 1. 
Uncertainty avoidance. In his study of how values in the workplace are 
influenced by culture, Hofstede (2001) identified power distance, individualism, 
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masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation as dimensions of national 
culture. We measured country-level uncertainty avoidance using the time-invariant 
country scores provided by Hofstede (2001). 
Control variables. In order to minimize omitted-variable bias, we also included 
several firm-level control variables: firm size, firm age, debt-to-equity ratio, product 
diversification, R&D intensity, and firm performance. Firm size is any indicator of the 
size of the firm, such as a firm’s total assets, sales, or employees (e.g., Goerzen & 
Beamish, 2003). Firm age is any indicator of the age of the firm, such as the number of 
years since establishment (e.g., Zahra et al., 2000). Debt-to-equity ratio reflects the 
degree of financial leverage of the firm, measured as the ratio of total debt to total equity 
(e.g., Goerzen & Beamish, 2003). Product diversification is a variable that reflects the 
diversification across industries of the firm, commonly operationalized using the 
Herfindahl or entropy index (e.g., Tallman & Li, 1996). R&D intensity is a variable that 
reflects the degree of R&D expenditure of the firm, commonly operationalized as the 
ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales or employees (e.g., Li & Tallman, 2011). Firm 
performance is any indicator of the financial performance of the firm, including 
accounting- and market-based measures of performance (e.g., Hitt et al., 1997). 
MASEM procedure 
To test our hypotheses, we used MASEM (Bergh et al., 2016; Carney et al., 2011; 
Cheung & Chan, 2005; van Essen et al., 2015a). In the first step of the two-stage 
procedure, we computed mean correlations between the variables of interest through 
separate Hedges-Olkin meta-analyses (HOMAs) in Stata 13 (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). In 
order to run the HOMAs, we first collected from the primary studies the bivariate 
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correlations (i.e., Pearson’s r) between all the variables of interest. We followed 
established guidelines and chose the effect size, rather than the article, as our unit of 
analysis (Bergh et al., 2016). When multiple operationalizations of the constructs 
concerning a focal effect were used in a primary study, we included all of them in our 
analyses.4 Each effect size was weighted by its inverse variance weight w to account for 
differences across effect sizes (Hedges & Olkin, 1985).5 When computing the weighted 
mean correlations, we used a 1.0 reliability estimate for all the variables. We used a 1.0 
level of reliability because the variables of interest for our study are not particularly 
exposed to measurement error, since they do not leave much room for subjectivity to 
researchers carrying out a primary study. While a conservative 0.80 reliability estimate is 
recommended by some scholars (e.g., Aguinis et al., 2011), both Dalton and his 
colleagues (1998) and Bergh and his colleagues (2016) did not find any substantive 
difference in the results of their meta-analyses when using a 1.0 level of reliability 
instead of a 0.80 level. In order to compute the weighted mean correlations, we run 
random-effects HOMAs, which are more conservative than fixed-effects HOMAs and 
account for potential heterogeneity in the effect size distribution (Kisamore & Brannick, 
                                                            
4 Research has shown that including all the effect sizes, as opposed to including a single value for each 
study, provides advantages in terms of parameter significance testing and parameter estimation accuracy 
(Bijmolt & Pieters, 2001). 
5 w is calculated as follows: , where SE is the standard error of the effect size and is the 
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2008). When running the HOMAs, we also computed the standard error for each mean 
correlation.6 
In the second step of the two-stage procedure, we run structural equation 
modeling (SEM) using maximum-likelihood routines in LISREL 8 (Cheung & Chan, 
2005). The meta-analytic matrix of mean correlations provided the data to run SEM and 
no cell contained missing values. MASEM has the advantage that not all relationships 
under examination need to be included in each primary study, as each cell in the meta-
analytic matrix of mean correlations is a different subset of all included studies (Carney 
et al., 2011; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995). We based our SEM estimation of the 
coefficients on the harmonic mean of the sample sizes. This allowed us to deal with the 
sample size differences and reduce the concern that larger samples might affect the 
estimation more than smaller samples (Bergh et al., 2016; Carney et al., 2011; van Essen 
et al., 2015a). Below is the equation that we estimated to test Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2: 
Degree of ID = Σ βi CG Mechanismi + Σ γj Controlj + ε   (1) 
where Degree of ID is the extent of foreign expansion, CG Mechanismi is the 
individual corporate governance mechanism, and Controlj is the individual control 
variable. In order to test Hypothesis 3, we estimated the following equation: 
CG Mechanismi = β1 Degree of ID + Σ γj Controlj + ε   (2) 
                                                            
6 The meta-analytic mean is calculated as follows: , with its standard error: 
, and with its 95% confidence interval computed as: , 
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The tests of Hypotheses 4-6 required a distinction between depth and breadth of 
international diversification, rather than a focus on the overall degree of expansion 
abroad. Therefore, we simultaneously estimated the following two equations to test 
Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5: 
Depth of ID = Σ βi CG Mechanismi + Σ γj Controlj + ε   (3) 
Breadth of ID = Σ βi CG Mechanismi + Σ γj Controlj + ε   (4) 
Furthermore, we estimated the equation reported below to test Hypothesis 6: 
CG Mechanismi = β1 Depth of ID + β2 Breadth of ID + Σ γj Controlj + ε (5) 
In order to test Hypothesis 7 and Hypothesis 8, which focus on the moderating 
effect of the legal protection of minority shareholders, we split the data set into two 
subsets using the median value of the country-level contingency. Next, we computed two 
different meta-analytic correlation matrices, respectively for high and low levels of legal 
shareholder protection. Then, to test Hypothesis 7 and Hypothesis 8, we estimated again, 
respectively, Equation (1) and Equation (2) for both high and low levels of the legal 
protection of minority shareholders. 
Similarly, to assess the moderating effect of country-level uncertainty avoidance, 
on which Hypothesis 9 focuses, we divided the sample into two subsamples based on the 
median value of this national culture dimension. Next, we computed two different meta-
analytic correlation matrices, respectively for high and low levels of uncertainty 
avoidance. Then, to test Hypothesis 9, we estimated again Equation (1) for both high and 
low levels of uncertainty avoidance. 
Due to meta-analytic data availability, when testing Hypotheses 6-9, we focus 
only on three (soft) corporate governance mechanisms, which we previously discussed 
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from an agency theory perspective: ownership concentration, institutional ownership, and 
inside ownership. 
RESULTS 
Table 2.1 reports the meta-analytic correlation matrix, which shows, with regard to the 
CG-ID relationship, a negative mean effect size for ownership concentration (r-based 
mean effect size = -0.005; p = 0.775) and inside ownership (r-based mean effect size = -
0.029; p = 0.102), and a positive mean effect size for institutional ownership (r-based 
mean effect size = 0.016; p = 0.326), CEO/chairman separation (r-based mean effect size 
= 0.026; p = 0.305), CEO pay (r-based mean effect size = 0.115; p = 0.021), and board 
independence (r-based mean effect size = 0.012; p = 0.585). Therefore, while some 
corporate governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem have a positive 
association with the degree of international diversification, others are negatively 
correlated to it. Table 2.1 also shows that the corporate governance mechanisms 
providing better access to organizational and managerial resources, i.e., CEO tenure (r-
based mean effect size = 0.025; p = 0.229) and board size (r-based mean effect size = 
0.079; p = 0.0001) are positively associated with the degree of international 
diversification. The results of the HOMAs, however, do not give any information about 
the direction of causality, since they are based on Pearson’s r. Moreover, they do not take 
into account the interdependencies among the corporate governance mechanisms, as well 
as the effect of control variables. 
Effects of corporate governance on the degree of international diversification 
Table 2.2 shows the MASEM results for the direct effects model (Model 1) linking 
corporate governance mechanisms to the degree of international diversification, based on 
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Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. In this model, each corporate governance variable is 
related directly to the degree of international diversification. Moreover, each corporate 
governance variable covaries with the other corporate governance variables and the firm-
level controls, which, instead, covaries only with the corporate governance variables.7 
Furthermore, independent and dependent variables are observed variables; no latent 
construct is included in the model. 
Regarding Hypothesis 1, our results show that ownership concentration 
(coefficient = -0.0077, t value = -0.59), inside ownership (coefficient = -0.012, t value = -
0.84), and board independence (coefficient = -0.0083, t value = -0.63) are negatively 
related to the size of the foreign footprint. However, the mean effect sizes, especially for 
ownership concentration and board independence, are quite small. By contrast, 
institutional ownership (coefficient = 0.012, t value = 0.89), CEO/chairman separation 
(coefficient = 0.046, t value = 3.12), and CEO pay (coefficient = 0.078, t value = 3.97) 
are positively related to the degree of international diversification. The effect of 
institutional ownership, though, is quite small compared to the effect of CEO/chairman 
separation and CEO pay. Overall, our findings provide partial empirical support for the 
idea that corporate governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem positively 
affect the degree of international diversification. With regard to Hypothesis 2, we find 
that CEO tenure (coefficient = 0.040, t value = 2.80) is positively associated with the 
degree of international diversification. By contrast, the effect of board size (coefficient = 
-0.020, t value = -1.19) on the extent of foreign expansion is negative, though smaller in 
magnitude than that of CEO tenure. Our results, therefore, provide partial empirical 
support for the idea that corporate governance mechanisms providing better access to 
                                                            
7 This is necessary to have enough degrees of freedom to estimate the model. 
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organizational and managerial resources are positively related to the degree of 
international diversification. Figure 2.3 offers a schematic representation of our results 
concerning the effect of corporate governance on the degree of international 
diversification. 
The direct effects model linking corporate governance mechanisms to the degree 
of international diversification fits the data relatively well (߯-square (15) = 784.03, p-
value < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.096; CFI = 0.91; NFI = 0.90; RMR = 0.039). 
Effects of the degree of international diversification on corporate governance 
Table 2.3 shows the results of the direct effects model (Model 2) linking the degree of 
international diversification to corporate governance mechanisms, based on Hypothesis 3. 
In this model, the degree of international diversification is related directly to each 
corporate governance variable. Moreover, the firm-level control variables do not covary 
with one another.8 Furthermore, independent and dependent variables are observed 
variables; no latent construct is included in the model. Our results show that the degree of 
international diversification is negatively related to ownership concentration (coefficient 
= -0.008, t value = -0.58) and institutional ownership (coefficient = -0.003, t value = -
0.25), even though the mean effect sizes are very small. Furthermore, the effect of foreign 
expansion on inside ownership (coefficient = -0.005, t value = -0.36) and board 
independence (coefficient = -0.007, t value = -0.50) is negative, although―again―the 
mean effect sizes are very small. We also find that the degree of international 
diversification is positively associated with board size (coefficient = 0.013, t value = 
1.02), CEO tenure (coefficient = 0.024, t value = 1.73), CEO pay (coefficient = 0.036, t 
value = 3.03), and CEO/chairman separation (coefficient = 0.016, t value = 1.19). Our 
                                                            
8 This is necessary to have consistency with Model 1. 
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results, therefore, provide partial empirical support for the idea that the degree of 
international diversification positively influences the activation of corporate governance 
mechanisms addressing the agency problem and/or increasing the information-processing 
capacity of the firm. Figure 2.4 offers a schematic representation of our results 
concerning the effect of the degree of international diversification on corporate 
governance. 
The direct effects model linking the degree of international diversification to 
corporate governance mechanisms achieves worse fit than the direct effects model 
linking corporate governance mechanisms to the degree of international diversification 
(߯-square (43) = 4222.66, p-value < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.132; CFI = 0.39; NFI = 0.39; 
RMR = 0.076). This suggests that corporate governance explains the variation of 
international diversification better than international diversification explains the variation 
of corporate governance. 
Effects of corporate governance on the depth and breadth of international 
diversification 
Table 2.4 shows the results for the direct effects model (Model 3) linking corporate 
governance mechanisms to depth and breadth of international diversification, based on 
Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5. In this model, each corporate governance variable is 
related directly to depth and breadth of international diversification. Moreover, each 
corporate governance variable covaries with the other corporate governance variables and 
the firm-level controls, which, instead, covaries only with the corporate governance 
variables.9 Furthermore, independent and dependent variables are observed variables; no 
latent construct is included in the model. With regard to Hypothesis 4, our results show 
                                                            
9 This is necessary to have consistency with Model 1. 
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that ownership concentration negatively affects the depth of foreign expansion 
(coefficient = -0.019, t value = -1.44), but positively influences the breadth (coefficient = 
0.028, t value = 2.28). Similarly, institutional ownership has a negative, though very 
small, effect on the depth of international diversification (coefficient = -0.0033, t value = 
-0.24), but a positive effect on the breadth (coefficient = 0.09, t value = 7.08). Moreover, 
CEO/chairman separation and CEO pay positively affect both dimensions of international 
diversification, but the effect on breadth (coefficient for CEO/chairman separation = 
0.094, t value = 6.89; coefficient for CEO pay = 0.32, t value = 17.35) is stronger than the 
effect on depth (coefficient for CEO/chairman separation = 0.040, t value = 2.74; 
coefficient for CEO pay = 0.045, t value = 2.34). By contrast, inside ownership and board 
independence have a positive, though very small, effect on the depth of international 
diversification (coefficient for inside ownership = 0.0036, t value = 0.27; coefficient for 
board independence = 0.0043, t value = 0.33), but a negative effect on the breadth 
(coefficient for inside ownership = -0.066, t value = -5.20; coefficient for board 
independence = -0.085, t value = -6.96). Our findings, therefore, provide partial empirical 
support for the idea that the positive effect of corporate governance mechanisms 
addressing the agency problem is stronger on the breadth than on the depth of 
international diversification. 
Regarding Hypothesis 5, our results show that CEO tenure positively influences 
both dimensions of international diversification, but the effect on depth (coefficient = 
0.042, t value = 3.03) is larger than that on breadth (coefficient = 0.034, t value = 2.59). 
Also, board size has a positive effect on the depth of international diversification 
(coefficient = 0.017, t value = 1.01), but a negative effect on the breadth (coefficient = -
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0.22, t value = -14.29). Our findings, therefore, do not provide empirical support for the 
idea that the positive effect of corporate governance mechanisms providing better access 
to organizational and managerial resources is stronger on the breadth than on the depth of 
international diversification. 
Effects of the depth and breadth of international diversification on corporate 
governance 
Table 2.5 shows the results of the direct effects model (Model 4) linking depth and 
breadth of international diversification to corporate governance mechanisms, based on 
Hypothesis 6. In this model, the dimensions of international diversification are related 
directly to each corporate governance variable. Moreover, the firm-level control variables 
do not covary with one another.10 Furthermore, independent and dependent variables are 
observed variables; no latent construct is included in the model. Our results show that the 
depth of foreign expansion has a negative effect on ownership concentration (coefficient 
= -0.022, t value = -1.61); by contrast, the breadth has a positive effect (coefficient = 
0.022, t value = 1.56). Similarly, the depth of international diversification negatively 
affects institutional ownership (coefficient = -0.016, t value = -1.21), while the breadth 
positively influences it (coefficient = 0.028, t value = 1.99). Moreover, both dimensions 
of international diversification positively affect CEO pay, but the effect of breadth 
(coefficient = 0.11, t value = 8.98) is stronger than the effect of depth (coefficient = 
0.0068, t value = 0.58). Both depth and breadth have a positive effect on CEO tenure; 
however, unlike their effect on CEO pay, the effect of depth (coefficient = 0.027, t value 
= 1.94) is stronger than the effect of breadth (coefficient = 0.0035, t value = 0.25). By 
contrast, the depth of foreign expansion positively influences inside ownership, 
                                                            
10 This is necessary to have consistency Model 1. 
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CEO/chairman separation, and board independence (coefficient for inside ownership = 
0.013, t value = 0.96; coefficient for CEO/chairman separation = 0.017, t value = 1.25; 
coefficient for board independence = 0.023, t value = 1.72), while the breadth negatively 
affects those corporate governance mechanisms (coefficient for inside ownership = -
0.036, t value = -2.60; coefficient for CEO/chairman separation = -0.00056, t value = -
0.04; coefficient for board independence = -0.085, t value = -6.05). Our findings, 
therefore, provide partial empirical support for the idea that the positive effect on the 
activation of corporate governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem and/or 
increasing the information-processing capacity of the firm is stronger for the breadth than 
for the depth of international diversification. 
Similar to the comparison between the fit of Model 1 and that of Model 2, the fit 
of Model 3 (߯-square (16) = 1140.66, p-value < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.110; CFI = 0.89; NFI 
= 0.89; RMR = 0.042), which links corporate governance mechanisms to depth and 
breadth of international diversification, is better than that of the Model 4 (߯-square (43) = 
4566.22, p-value < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.134, CFI = 0.45, NFI = 0.45, RMR = 0.072), 
which links depth and breadth of international diversification to corporate governance 
mechanisms. This suggests that corporate governance explains the variation of the 
international diversification dimensions better than the international diversification 
dimensions explain the variation of corporate governance. 
Moderating effect of the legal protection of minority shareholders on CGID 
Table 2.6 shows the results for the direct effects models linking, based on Hypothesis 7, 
corporate governance mechanisms to the degree of international diversification under 
conditions of high (Model 5) and low (Model 6) legal protection of minority 
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shareholders. In these models, each corporate governance variable is related directly to 
the degree of international diversification. Our results show that ownership concentration 
negatively affects the degree of international diversification when the legal protection of 
minority shareholders is high (coefficient = -0.033, t value = -5.46), but positively 
influences it when the legal protection of minority shareholders is low (coefficient = 
0.034, t value = 3.78). Moreover, institutional ownership has a positive, though small, 
effect on the extent of foreign expansion both when the legal shareholder protection is 
high (coefficient = 0.00093, t value = 0.15) and when this country-level contingency is 
low (coefficient = 0.0055, t value = 0.62), but the effect is larger in the latter case. By 
contrast, inside ownership has a negative effect on the degree of international 
diversification both when the legal shareholder protection is high (coefficient = -0.011, t 
value = -1.75) and when this country-level contingency is low (coefficient = -0.0055, t 
value = -0.60), but the effect is larger in the former case. Our findings, therefore, provide 
very limited empirical support for the idea that the positive effect of (soft) corporate 
governance mechanisms addressing the agency problem on the degree of international 
diversification weakens as the level of legal minority shareholder protection increases. 
Moderating effect of the legal protection of minority shareholders on IDCG 
Table 2.7 shows the results for the direct effects models linking, based on Hypothesis 8, 
the degree of international diversification to corporate governance mechanisms under 
conditions of high (Model 7) and low (Model 8) legal protection of minority 
shareholders. In these models, the degree of international diversification is related 
directly to each corporate governance variable. Our results show that the degree of 
international diversification negatively affects ownership concentration when the legal 
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protection of minority shareholders is high (coefficient = -0.033, t value = -5.41), but 
positively influences it when the legal protection of minority shareholders is low 
(coefficient = 0.034, t value = 3.67). Similarly, institutional ownership has a negative, 
though very small, effect on the extent of foreign expansion when the legal shareholder 
protection is high (coefficient = -0.00016, t value = -0.027), but a positive one, though 
very small, when this country-level contingency is low (coefficient = 0.001, t value = 
0.11). By contrast, the degree of international diversification negatively affects inside 
ownership both when the legal shareholder protection is high (coefficient = -0.0096, t 
value = -1.59) and when this country-level contingency is low (coefficient = -0.00078, t 
value = -0.089), but the effect is larger in the former case. Our findings, therefore, 
provide very limited empirical support for the idea that the positive effect of the degree of 
international diversification on the activation of (soft) corporate governance mechanisms 
addressing the agency problem weakens as the level of legal minority shareholder 
protection increases. 
Similar to the comparison between the fit of Model 1 and that of Model 2, the fit 
of Model 5 (߯-square (3) = 749.09, p-value < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.095; CFI = 0.83; NFI = 
0.83; RMR = 0.026), which links corporate governance mechanisms to the degree of 
international diversification when the legal shareholder protection is high, is higher than 
that of the Model 7 (߯-square (6) = 1208.23, p-value < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.085; CFI = 
0.73; NFI = 0.73; RMR = 0.033), which links the degree of international diversification 
to corporate governance mechanisms when the legal shareholder protection is high. 
Similarly, the fit of Model 6 (߯-square (3) = 219.58, p-value < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.076; 
CFI = 0.93; NFI = 0.93; RMR = 0.022), which links corporate governance mechanisms to 
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the degree of international diversification when the legal shareholder protection is low, is 
higher than that of the Model 8 (߯-square (8) = 819.54, p-value < 0.001; RMSEA = 
0.104; CFI = 0.75; NFI = 0.75; RMR = 0.041), which links the degree of international 
diversification to corporate governance mechanisms when the legal shareholder 
protection is low. This suggests―again―that corporate governance explains the 
variation of international diversification better than international diversification explains 
the variation of corporate governance. 
Moderating effect of national uncertainty avoidance on CGID 
Table 2.8 shows the results for the direct effects models linking, based on Hypothesis 9, 
corporate governance mechanisms to the degree of international diversification under 
conditions of high (Model 9) and low (Model 10) uncertainty avoidance. In these models, 
each corporate governance variable is related directly to the degree of international 
diversification. Our results show that ownership concentration negatively affects the 
degree of international diversification when uncertainty avoidance is high (coefficient = -
0.010, t value = -0.69), but positively influences it when uncertainty avoidance is low 
(coefficient = 0.028, t value = 5.93). Similarly, institutional ownership has a negative 
effect on the degree of international diversification when uncertainty avoidance is high 
(coefficient = -0.13, t value = -8.84), but a positive one when uncertainty avoidance is 
low (coefficient = 0.046, t value = 9.64). Also, inside ownership negatively influences the 
degree of international diversification when uncertainty avoidance is high (coefficient = -
0.047, t value = -3.20), but positively affects it when uncertainty avoidance is low 
(coefficient = 0.010, t value = 2.18). Our findings, therefore, provide partial empirical 
support for the idea that the positive effect of corporate governance mechanisms 
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addressing the agency problem on the degree of international diversification weakens as 
the level of uncertainty avoidance increases. 
DISCUSSION 
The inconclusive and inconsistent empirical findings about the CG-ID relationship were 
the starting point of this meta-analytic study, in which we explored the complex 
interdependence between corporate governance and international diversification. 
Causal linkages between corporate governance and international diversification 
The first key finding of our MASEM study is that, as the agency theory, resource, and 
information-processing perspectives suggest, bidirectional causal linkages exist between 
corporate governance and international diversification. This important finding 
constructively addresses the potential scientific apophenia (i.e., the tendency to find 
evidence of order where none exists) in the CG-ID research area (e.g., Goldfarb & King, 
2016; Harrison et al., 2014). It also shows the multifaceted interdependence between 
corporate governance and international diversification (e.g., Buckley & Strange, 2011; 
Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). Furthermore, it provides additional evidence in support of 
the complementarity and substitutability between corporate governance mechanisms at 
the firm level (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2008, 2012; Dalton et al., 2003). 
The agency theory perspective suggests that certain corporate governance 
mechanisms will positively affect international diversification by curbing the agency 
problem resulting from managerial risk aversion. Our findings show that institutional 
ownership, CEO/chairman separation, and CEO compensation have this role of foreign 
expansion facilitators. Therefore, our study adds to the body of empirical evidence 
showing the role played by those mechanisms in the principal-agent relationship. 
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Interestingly, however, we find that inside ownership has a negative effect on the extent 
of foreign expansion, which corroborates the idea in the management and finance 
literatures that the use of equity for compensation results in greater incentives to ‘play it 
safe’, as a larger slice of executives’ financial wealth is linked to the firm’s prospects 
(e.g., Gormley & Matsa, 2016). Also, ownership concentration and board independence 
have a negative impact on the degree of international diversification. Their effect, 
however, is very small, suggesting that a more nuanced relationship may exist, depending 
on whether the focus is on the depth or breadth of international diversification. 
The resource perspective suggests that certain corporate governance mechanisms 
will positively affect the degree of international diversification by providing better access 
to organizational and managerial resources. Consistent with the idea that a longer tenure 
may better equip CEOs to cope with the challenges of such a resource-intensive and risky 
move as international diversification, we find that this corporate governance mechanism 
has a positive effect on expansion abroad. By contrast, board size has a negative effect on 
the degree of international diversification. While counterintuitive from a resource 
perspective, this result may be explained through an agency theory lens. Corporate 
governance scholars point out that larger boards may aggravate the agency problem, 
amplifying the effect of managerial risk aversion: “even if boards’ capacities for 
monitoring increase with board size, the benefits are outweighed by such costs as slower 
decision-making, less-candid discussions of managerial performance, and biases against 
risk-taking” (Yermack, 1996: 186). 
In addition to the impact of firms’ corporate governance mechanisms on the 
degree of international diversification, our MASEM results provide support for the 
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prediction that foreign expansion prompts the activation of corporate governance 
mechanisms addressing the agency problem and/or increasing the information processing 
capacity of the firm. Consistent with previous international management research, we 
find that the higher information-processing demands and/or greater information 
asymmetries associated with larger operations abroad result in longer CEO tenure, higher 
CEO pay, CEO/chairman separation, and larger board size (e.g., Sanders & Carpenter, 
1998). Furthermore, the effect on CEO/chairman separation provides empirical support 
for an institution-based resource perspective (e.g., Kostova et al., 2008; Marano et al., 
2016) on corporate governance, since CEO/chairman separation is one of the 
“mechanisms largely held as “silver bullets” for the governance problem” (Misangyi & 
Acharya, 2014: 1702). Similar considerations may be made also for CEO compensation, 
given its central position in the agency framework since the development of agency 
theory (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 2010; van Essen et al., 2015b). 
The role of depth and breadth of international diversification 
The second key finding of our MASEM study is that the nature of the causal linkages in 
the CG-ID relationship depends on the dimension of international diversification. While 
the international management literature has clearly pointed out that international 
diversification is a multidimensional construct (e.g., Hitt et al., 2006), extant research 
says little about whether and how depth and breadth differently affect and/or are 
differently affected by corporate governance. Our findings improve our understanding of 
this relevant theoretical aspect. From an agency theory perspective, we predicted that 
certain corporate governance mechanisms have a stronger positive effect on the breadth 
of foreign expansion than on the depth. Consistent with our prediction, CEO/chairman 
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separation and CEO pay positively affect both dimensions of international diversification, 
but breadth to a larger extent. Furthermore, ownership concentration and institutional 
ownership negatively influence depth, but positively breadth. The negative effect on the 
depth of international diversification suggests that shareholders with the ability, 
incentive, and power to monitor and control managers (e.g., Filatotchev et al., 2007; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) may limit executives’ pursuit of the private benefits associated 
with an increase in the size of the foreign footprint (e.g., Buckley & Strange, 2011; 
Morck & Yeung, 1991). Expansion abroad implies larger firm size, which may affect 
power, reputation, and compensation of executives (e.g., Buckley & Strange, 2011). 
Also, such a risky strategic move as international diversification may protect managers’ 
job, since it makes harder to assess their contribution to performance and, thus, their 
managerial skills (e.g., Hermalin, 1993). At the same time, the positive effect of 
ownership concentration and institutional ownership on the breadth of international 
diversification suggests that the aforementioned shareholders may seek the benefits, in 
terms of development and expansion of the resource endowment, associated with greater 
institutional, competitive, and technological heterogeneity of the ‘host-country portfolio’ 
(e.g., Kafouros et al., 2012; Kostova et al., 2008). Our findings regarding the effect of 
inside ownership (positive effect on depth and negative on breadth) do not support our 
prediction. However, those findings are consistent with the idea, previously discussed, 
that the use of equity for compensation results in greater managerial risk aversion. 
Managers, therefore, may pursue the private benefits associated with depth, while 
avoiding the risks inherent in breadth. Finally, the fact that board independence has a 
negative effect on the breadth of international diversification and almost no effect on the 
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depth seems to point out the intrinsic limitations of this corporate governance 
mechanism, e.g., the actual independence of outside directors, as well as the hurdles to its 
proper functioning, including board processes and board culture (e.g., Pye, 2001; Udueni, 
1999). 
Also from a resource perspective, we predicted that certain corporate governance 
mechanisms have a stronger positive effect on the breadth of foreign expansion than on 
the depth. Our findings do not support such prediction. The positive effect of board size 
on depth and the negative effect on breadth, while counterintuitive from a resource 
perspective, may be explained from an agency theory perspective. As discussed above, 
larger boards may exacerbate the agency problem and, consequently, favor the pursuit of 
the private benefits of depth and the avoidance of the risks of breadth by the top 
management. As regards CEO tenure, our findings suggest that longer tenures provide 
access to organizational and managerial resources that are industry- and host country-
specific and, thus, more fruitful when expanding the depth rather than the breadth. 
The distinction between depth and breadth is relevant also when focusing on the 
effect of international diversification on corporate governance mechanisms. However, 
our prediction of a greater positive effect of breadth than of depth receives support only 
for CEO compensation, ownership concentration, and institutional ownership. 
The moderating role of the legal shareholder protection and uncertainty avoidance 
The third key finding of our MASEM study is that the CG-ID relationship is moderated 
by two country-level contingencies: the legal protection of minority shareholders and 
uncertainty avoidance. Previous research says little about potential factors affecting the 
CG-ID relationship. Our study, therefore, sheds some preliminary light on this additional 
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aspect of the complex causal interdependence between corporate governance and 
international diversification. 
Specifically, our findings do not suggest a strong substitution (e.g., Dalton et al., 
2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) across levels between hard and soft corporate governance 
mechanisms. However, the fact that ownership concentration has a non-negligible 
positive effect on the degree of international diversification when the legal protection of 
minority shareholders is low, and a non-negligible negative one when the country-level 
contingency is high, suggests that controlling shareholders may have, within distinct 
national corporate governance systems, different perceptions of expansion abroad. The 
legal protection of minority shareholders moderates the relationship between ownership 
concentration and international diversification also when focusing on the opposite 
direction of causality. International diversification may naturally lead to more dispersed 
ownership when the legal protection of minority shareholders is high (e.g., Luo, 2005). 
However, consistent with an agency theory perspective, ownership concentration is 
activated as a response to increases in the foreign footprint when the legal shareholder 
protection is low. 
Our findings also show that uncertainty avoidance moderates the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the degree of international diversification to such 
an extent that their effect turns negative when uncertainty avoidance is high. 
Explanatory power of the alternative directions of causality 
The fourth key finding of our MASEM study is that corporate governance explains the 
variation of international diversification better than international diversification explains 
the variation of corporate governance. In all comparisons of the fit of CGID models 
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versus that of IDCG models, the fit of the models linking corporate governance 
mechanisms to the degree of international diversification is better. This suggests, from 
both a theory and practice perspective, the primary ex-ante (as opposed to ex-post) nature 
of corporate governance mechanisms. 
MASEM versus traditional meta-analysis 
The fifth key finding of our MASEM study is that the magnitude and sign of the CG-ID 
relationship in the MASEM results are, in some cases, different from those in the HOMA 
results. This confirms the importance, when conducting meta-analytic studies, of going 
beyond traditional techniques, in order to take into account the interdependencies 
between all the independent variables as well as the effect of control variables (e.g., 
Bergh et al., 2016). Our study, therefore, is consistent with recent best practices in 
management research as to how conduct meta-analyses, including the use of partial 
correlation as effect size, MARA techniques, and MASEM techniques (e.g., Carney et 
al., 2011; van Essen et al., 2012, 2015a). 
Lastly, we point out that, when studying whether and how corporate governance 
mechanisms affect firms’ expansion abroad and vice versa, endogeneity is a relevant 
issue due to potential reverse causality effects. A limitation of our study, therefore, is that 
meta-analytic techniques, including MASEM, are not ideal for addressing endogeneity 
issues. We, therefore, encourage scholars exploring in the future the CG-ID relationship 
to incorporate in their research design solutions to address this potential methodological 
issue. Strictly related to this, we believe that our study may be fruitfully complemented 
by further research using different data and methodologies. For example, research based 
on secondary data could explore whether and how the ratio of fixed to variable executive 
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compensation, which is a variable difficult to measure within a meta-analytic research 
design, affects and/or is affected by firms’ degree of international diversification. 
Similarly, future research based on secondary data could explore the effect of different 
ownership identities on the extent of foreign expansion. While data on ownership identity 
may be collected within a meta-analytic research design, measurement error is likely to 
be higher, especially when considering identity in conjunction with the owned share of 
the firm equity. 
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TABLE 2.1: Meta-Analytic Correlation Matrix 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Firm size 1.000 194,302 174,268 21,489 8,576 248,556 59,213 39,137 
2. Firm age 0.194 1.000 141,042 13,873 5,337 165,614 35,785 21,289 
3. Debt-to-equity 
ratio 0.087 0.016 1.000 10,640 3,966 171,022 33,748 25,398 
4. CEO tenure -0.020 -0.018 -0.069 1.000 8,042 13,079 12,260 7,197 
5. CEO pay 0.461 0.228 0.140 -0.062 1.000 4,412 6,310 4,134 
6. Ownership 
concentration 0.027 0.000 0.010 0.108 -0.061 1.000 48,324 33,693 
7. Institutional 
ownership 0.103 0.076 0.046 -0.016 -0.091 -0.051 1.000 10,207 
8. Inside 
ownership -0.094 -0.066 -0.046 0.253 -0.082 0.009 0.102 1.000 
9. CEO/chairman 
separation 0.036 0.091 -0.025 -0.246 -0.229 0.035 -0.026 -0.123 
10. Board 
independence 0.067 -0.017 0.022 -0.067 0.086 -0.069 0.014 -0.080 
11. Board size 0.338 0.129 0.012 -0.113 0.561 -0.010 0.077 -0.171 
12. Product 
diversification 0.189 0.164 0.013 -0.022 0.067 -0.014 0.092 -0.052 
13. International 
diversification 0.171 0.026 -0.024 0.025 0.115 -0.005 0.016 -0.029 
14. R&D intensity 0.055 -0.047 -0.109 0.026 0.042 -0.005 -0.006 -0.057 
15. Performance 0.057 -0.010 -0.110 0.055 0.147 0.005 0.020 0.018 
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TABLE 2.1: Meta-Analytic Correlation Matrix (continued) 
Variable 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Firm size 7,129 55,255 64,440 139,740 381,029 72,106 230,470 
2. Firm age 3,518 26,507 25,934 89,957 293,283 31,152 143,108 
3. Debt-to-equity 
ratio 3,225 13,773 25,617 86,363 277,666 40,869 143,463 
4. CEO tenure 3,622 4,000 1,165 5,699 23,758 8,647 9,480 
5. CEO pay 620 3,048 192 17,131 22,986 928 1,834 
6. Ownership 
concentration 2,869 8,924 33,147 167,320 265,302 73,898 109,019 
7. Institutional 
ownership 3,780 5,894 18,848 4,217 62,143 39,484 65,486 
8. Inside 
ownership 2,615 10,382 2,472 22,610 45,727 8,086 32,577 
9. CEO/chairman 
separation 1.000 2,955 2,410 5,652 9,520 3,227 6,001 
10. Board 
independence -0.027 1.000 33,186 13,493 84,993 5,490 42,457 
11. Board size 0.038 0.049 1.000 2,057 110,382 17,327 23,591 
12. Product 
diversification -0.035 0.067 0.215 1.000 170,451 30,426 100,205 
13. International 
diversification 0.026 0.012 0.079 0.084 1.000 88,137 248,494 
14. R&D intensity 0.036 0.028 0.011 0.012 0.165 1.000 64104 
15. Performance 0.051 0.020 0.086 0.001 0.037 -0.009 1.000 
 
Cells below the diagonal contain mean correlations. Cells above the diagonal contain the total number of observations (N) 
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TABLE 2.2: MASEM Results for CGID 
Model 1 
 International diversification 
 
Firm size 0.12
 (0.015)
 (8.36)
 
Firm age -0.022
 (0.014)
 (-1.60)
 
Debt-to-equity ratio -0.025
 (0.013)
 (-1.91)
 
Product diversification 0.063
 (0.013)
 (4.67)
 
R&D intensity 0.15
 (0.013)
 (11.27)
 
Performance 0.014
 (0.013)
 (1.05)
 
CEO tenure 0.040
 (0.014)
 (2.80)
 
CEO pay 0.078
 (0.020)
 (3.97)
 
Ownership concentration -0.0077
 (0.013)
 (-0.59)
 
Institutional ownership 0.012
 (0.014)
 (0.89)
 
Inside ownership -0.012
 (0.014)
 (-0.84)
 
CEO/chairman separation 0.046
 (0.015)
 (3.12)
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TABLE 2.2: MASEM Results for CGID (continued) 
 
Board independence -0.0083
 (0.013)
 (-0.63)
 
Board size -0.020
 (0.017)
 (-1.19)
 
Harmonic mean N (firm-years) 5560
Chi-square (df) 784.03 (15)
RMSEA 0.096
GFI 0.98
CFI 0.91
NFI 0.90
RMR 0.039
 
RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; CFI = comparative fit 
index; NFI = normed fit index; RMR = root mean square residual 
 
Standard errors and t values in parentheses 
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TABLE 2.3: MASEM Results for IDCG 
  Model 2   
 CEO tenure CEO pay 
Ownership 
concentration
Institutional 
ownership
    
Firm size -0.017 0.410 0.032 0.077
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
 (-1.27) (35.42) (2.35) (5.69)
 
Firm age -0.010 0.160 -0.003 0.049
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
 (-0.75) (13.48) (-0.24) (3.71)
 
Debt-to-equity ratio -0.059 0.120 0.007 0.039
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
 (-4.44) (10.62) (0.54) (2.97)
 
Product diversification -0.019 -0.041 -0.019 0.069
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
 (-1.39) (-3.60) (-1.41) (5.21)
 
R&D intensity 0.017 0.036 -0.005 -0.004
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
 (1.24) (3.07) (-0.33) (-0.27)
 
Performance 0.049 0.140 0.004 0.020
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
 (3.64) (11.96) (0.32) (1.54)
 
International diversification 0.024 0.036 -0.008 -0.003
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
 (1.73) (3.03) (-0.58) (-0.25)
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TABLE 2.3: MASEM Results for IDCG (continued) 
  Model 2   
 
Inside 
ownership
CEO/chairman 
separation
Board 
independence Board size 
    
Firm size -0.072 0.022 0.059 0.300
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
 (-5.36) (1.61) (4.39) (23.54)
 
Firm age -0.049 0.098 -0.037 0.047
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
 (-3.69) (7.38) (-2.80) (3.80)
 
Debt-to-equity ratio -0.043 -0.018 0.021 -0.010
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
 (-3.25) (-1.36) (1.60) (-0.76)
 
Product diversification -0.029 -0.057 0.062 0.150
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
 (-2.15) (-4.26) (4.63) (12.11)
 
R&D intensity -0.059 0.036 0.026 -0.007
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
 (-4.36) (2.66) (1.91) (-0.59)
 
Performance 0.017 0.049 0.019 0.068
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
 (1.24) (3.65) (1.42) (5.47)
 
International diversification -0.005 0.016 -0.007 0.013
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
 (-0.36) (1.19) (-0.50) (1.02)
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TABLE 2.3: MASEM Results for IDCG (continued) 
Harmonic mean N (firm-years) 5560
Chi-square (df) 4222.66 (43)
RMSEA 0.132
GFI 0.91
CFI 0.39
NFI 0.39
RMR 0.076
 
RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; NFI = normed fit index; RMR = root mean square 
residual 
 
Standard errors and t values in parentheses 
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TABLE 2.4: MASEM Results for CGID – Depth vs Breadth of 
International Diversification 
 Model 3  
 Depth of international diversification
Breadth of 
international diversification
  
CEO tenure 0.042 0.034 
 (0.014) (0.013) 
 (3.03) (2.59) 
  
CEO pay 0.045 0.32 
 (0.019) (0.018) 
 (2.34) (17.35) 
  
Ownership concentration -0.019 0.028 
 (0.013) (0.012) 
 (-1.44) (2.28) 
  
Institutional ownership -0.0033 0.09 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
 (-0.24) (7.08) 
  
Inside ownership 0.0036 -0.066 
 (0.014) (0.013) 
 (0.27) (-5.20) 
  
CEO/chairman separation 0.040 0.094 
 (0.015) (0.014) 
 (2.74) (6.89) 
  
Board independence 0.0043 -0.085 
 (0.013) (0.012) 
 (0.33) (-6.96) 
  
Board size 0.017 -0.22 
 (0.017) (0.016) 
 (1.01) (-14.29) 
  
Harmonic mean N (firm-years) 5859  
Chi-square (df) 1140.66 (16)  
RMSEA 0.110  
GFI 0.98  
CFI 0.89  
NFI 0.89  
RMR 0.042  
 
RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; CFI = 
comparative fit index; NFI = normed fit index; RMR = root mean square residual 
 
Results for the control variables are not reported (available upon request) 
 
Standard errors and t values in parentheses 
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TABLE 2.5: MASEM Results for IDCG – Depth vs Breadth of International Diversification 
   Model 4     
 CEO tenure CEO pay Ownership concentration
Institutional 
ownership
Inside 
ownership
CEO/chairman 
separation
Board 
independence Board size 
         
Depth of 
international diversification 0.027 0.0068 -0.022 -0.016 0.013 0.017 0.023 0.047
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
 (1.94) (0.58) (-1.61) (-1.21) (0.96) (1.25) (1.72) (3.71)
  
Breadth of 
international diversification 0.0035 0.11 0.022 0.028 -0.036 -0.00056 -0.085 -0.077
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
 (0.25) (8.98) (1.56) (1.99) (-2.60) (-0.04) (-6.05) (-5.91)
  
Harmonic mean N (firm-years) 5859 
Chi-square (df) 4566.22 (43)
RMSEA 0.134
GFI 0.91 
CFI 0.45 
NFI 0.45 
RMR 0.072
 
RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; NFI = normed fit index; RMR = root mean 
square residual 
 
Results for the control variables are not reported (available upon request) 
 
Standard errors and t values in parentheses 
 
 
 
 166 
 
TABLE 2.6: MASEM Results for CGID – High vs Low 
Legal Shareholder Protection 
 Model 5 Model 6 
 High legal shareholder protection
Low 
legal shareholder protection
 International diversification International diversification 
  
Ownership concentration -0.033 0.034 
 (0.006) (0.0089) 
 (-5.46) (3.78) 
  
Institutional ownership 0.00093 0.0055 
 (0.0061) (0.0089) 
 (0.15) (0.62) 
  
Inside ownership -0.011 -0.0055 
 (0.006) (0.0091) 
 (-1.75) (-0.60) 
  
Harmonic mean N (firm-years) 27562 12546 
Chi-square (df) 749.09 (3) 219.58 (3) 
RMSEA 0.095 0.076 
GFI 0.99 1.00 
CFI 0.83 0.93 
NFI 0.83 0.93 
RMR 0.026 0.022 
 
RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; CFI = 
comparative fit index; NFI = normed fit index; RMR = root mean square residual 
 
Results for the control variables are not reported (available upon request) 
 
Standard errors and t values in parentheses 
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TABLE 2.7: MASEM Results for IDCG – High vs Low 
Legal Shareholder Protection 
(a) High legal shareholder protection    
  Model 7  
 Ownership concentration
Institutional 
ownership
Inside 
ownership 
    
International diversification -0.033 -0.00016 -0.0096 
 (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0061) 
 (-5.41) (-0.027) (-1.59) 
  
Harmonic mean N (firm-years) 27562  
Chi-square (df) 1208.23 (6)  
RMSEA 0.085  
GFI 0.99  
CFI 0.73  
NFI 0.73  
RMR 0.033  
 
(b) Low legal shareholder protection    
  Model 8  
 Ownership concentration
Institutional 
ownership
Inside 
ownership 
    
International diversification 0.034 0.001 -0.00078 
 (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0088) 
 (3.67) (0.11) (-0.089) 
  
Harmonic mean N (firm-years) 12546  
Chi-square (df) 819.54 (6)  
RMSEA 0.104  
GFI 0.98  
CFI 0.75  
NFI 0.75  
RMR 0.041  
 
RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; CFI = 
comparative fit index; NFI = normed fit index; RMR = root mean square residual 
 
Results for the control variables are not reported (available upon request) 
 
Standard errors and t values in parentheses 
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TABLE 2.8: MASEM Results for CGID – High vs Low 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
 Model 9 Model 10 
 High uncertainty avoidance
Low 
uncertainty avoidance 
 International diversification International diversification 
  
Ownership concentration -0.010 0.028 
 0.014 0.0047 
 -0.69 5.93 
  
Institutional ownership -0.13 0.046 
 0.015 0.0047 
 -8.84 9.64 
  
Inside ownership -0.047 0.010 
 0.015 0.0047 
 -3.20 2.18 
  
Harmonic mean N (firm-years) 4787 44340 
Chi-square (df) 282.27 (3) 755.15 (3) 
RMSEA 0.139 0.075 
GFI 0.99 1.00 
CFI 0.81 0.90 
NFI 0.81 0.90 
RMR 0.040 0.021 
 
RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; CFI = 
comparative fit index; NFI = normed fit index; RMR = root mean square residual 
 
Results for the control variables are not reported (available upon request) 
 
Standard errors and t values in parentheses 
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FIGURE 2.1: Model Linking Corporate Governance to the Degree of International Diversification 
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FIGURE 2.2: Model Linking the Degree of International Diversification to Corporate Governance 
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FIGURE 2.3: Effects of Corporate Governance on the Degree of International Diversification 
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FIGURE 2.4: Effects of the Degree of International Diversification on Corporate Governance 
 
 
 
 
 173 
 
CONCLUSION
The dissertation extended extant literature on determinants and consequences of 
international diversification. In Essay I, we focused on the relationship between 
international diversification and firm performance. Our meta-analysis (the largest on this 
topic to date) shows that international diversification has an overall positive, but small, 
effect on firm performance, albeit with substantial variation in the effect size distribution 
depending on firms’ countries of origin. Firms in some countries experience significant 
negative performance effects from their internationalization efforts (e.g., in Mexico), 
while in others internationalization generates significant positive effects, which range 
from very small (e.g., in South Korea) to sizable (e.g., in Greece), or no effects (e.g., in 
the Netherlands and Spain). Further, we find that specific home-country institutions have 
different effects on the ID-P relationship. In particular, our results show that home-
country quality of business regulations, political risk, generalized trust, long-term 
orientation and uncertainty avoidance are all moderators of the ID-P relationship. 
This research makes three main contributions to the global strategy literature. 
First, we show that, in the aggregate, the positive linear association between 
internationalization and performance is modest, and should be considered only as a 
“stylized fact”. We also show that this relationship is contingent on home country 
institutional conditions, which can significantly affect the magnitude and sign of this 
relationship. Taken together, these results indicate that studies of the ID-P relationship 
should account for country-of-origin effect; if not, they are likely to be underspecified 
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both theoretically and empirically. Relatedly, our findings show the relevance of the 
institution-based view of strategy for studying the ID-P relationship. In particular, they 
suggest that home country institutions influence firms’ transaction costs and their 
managers’ cognitive processes, which, in turn, affect their ability to acquire and deploy 
strategic resources, and, ultimately, their potential to succeed in markets at home and 
abroad. To date, research has largely overlooked the importance of the institution-based 
view for contextualizing the ID-P relationship. Second, we show that multiple formal and 
informal institutions across many countries, over a long period of time, affect firms’ 
ability to benefit from internationalization, contributing to research on institutional 
complexity. In doing so, our study provides a richer assessment of how firms’ 
institutional embeddedness in their home country affects their effectiveness in 
international markets. Our third contribution is methodological and pertains to our meta-
analytical tests’ use of both Pearson product-moment correlation and partial correlation as 
effect sizes, which represents a significant improvement from existing meta-analyses that 
only used Pearson product-moment correlations. Incorporating partial correlations allows 
us to generate conclusive findings on several important matters that could not be properly 
addressed by previous meta-analyses, including the sign and shape of the I-P relationship. 
In Essay II, we focused on the relationship between corporate governance and 
international diversification. Our MASEM study contributes to the global strategy and 
corporate governance literatures through five key findings. The first key finding of our 
MASEM study is that, as the agency theory, resource, and information-processing 
perspectives suggest, bidirectional causal linkages exist between corporate governance 
and international diversification. This important finding constructively addresses the 
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potential scientific apophenia (i.e., the tendency to find evidence of order where none 
exists) in the CG-ID research area. It also shows the multifaceted interdependence 
between corporate governance and international diversification. Furthermore, it provides 
additional evidence in support of the complementarity and substitutability between 
corporate governance mechanisms at the firm level. The second key finding of our 
MASEM study is that the nature of the causal linkages in the CG-ID relationship depends 
on the dimension of international diversification. While the international management 
literature has clearly pointed out that international diversification is a multidimensional 
construct, extant research says little about whether and how depth and breadth differently 
affect and/or are differently affected by corporate governance. Our findings improve our 
understanding of this relevant theoretical aspect by showing that the positive effect of and 
on the breadth of international diversification tends to be greater. The third key finding of 
our MASEM study is that the CG-ID relationship is moderated by institutional and 
cultural conditions in the home country and, in particular, by the legal protection of 
minority shareholders and the national uncertainty avoidance. Previous research says 
little about potential factors affecting the CG-ID relationship. Our study, therefore, sheds 
some preliminary light on this additional aspect of the complex causal interdependence 
between corporate governance and international diversification. The fourth key finding of 
our MASEM study is that corporate governance explains the variation of international 
diversification better than international diversification explains the variation of corporate 
governance. The fifth key finding of our MASEM study is that the magnitude and sign of 
the CG-ID relationship in the MASEM results are, in some cases, different from those in 
the HOMA results. This confirms the importance, when conducting meta-analytic 
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studies, of going beyond traditional techniques, in order to take into account the 
interdependencies between all the independent variables as well as the effect of control 
variables. 
Although consisting of two meta-analyses, one of the main objectives of the 
present dissertation was to push forward the extant literature in three main ways: first, by 
explaining the mechanisms connecting the main constructs in our theoretical models; 
second, by assessing the role of the different dimensions of international diversification; 
third, by exploring the role of context (and, thus, advancing a theory in context) in the 
ID-P and CG-ID relationships. Indeed, meta-analysis has recently emerged in the 
management field not only as a data synthesis technique, but also as a methodological 
tool for theory advancement. Still, we believe that the dissertation essays could be 
expanded with further research using different data and methodologies. For example, our 
meta-analysis on the ID-P relationship could be complemented by case studies and other 
types of qualitative research investigating less explored factors at different levels of 
analysis that may shape firms’ ability to benefit from their internationalization efforts, 
including the role of managerial cognition and various process outcomes associated with 
internationalization. Our meta-analysis on the CG-ID relationship could be 
complemented, for example, by research that assesses, by using secondary data, the 
bidirectional causal effects between the two constructs while accounting for potential 
endogeneity in the relationship. 
From a more general perspective, this dissertation could be expanded by further 
research exploring the connections between international diversification and formal and 
informal institutions (and, thus, advancing a theory of context). A key finding of this 
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dissertation is that the home-country institutional context moderates the relationships 
between international diversification and its determinants and consequences. However, 
the formal and informal institutions of the home as well as the host country may play not 
just a moderating role in the causal chain. Indeed, the various institutional contexts 
confronting firms doing business internationally may directly influence and/or be 
influenced by firms’ decision to expand and invest abroad. 
Finally, we believe that this dissertation provides at least two valuable insights to 
the practice of international business. First, in current global business landscapes 
characterized by ongoing debates on corporate governance practices, we show the 
importance of executives’ risk preferences and corporate governance mechanisms in 
foreign expansion decisions. Second, we point out the role that home-country 
institutional contexts play in determining, on the one hand, the performance implications 
of international diversification and, on the other hand, the impact of firms’ corporate 
governance frameworks on their expansion abroad. 
 
 
 
